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In this thesis I analyze and problematize Francis Fukuyama´s position on 
posthumanism, largely expressed in his 2002 book Our Posthuman Future. In it he warns 
against the likely negative outcome of a potential biotechnological revolution, which could 
enable easy access to interfering with human genome via practices such as genetic 
modification or human cloning. Fukuyama´s major assumption is that all members of society 
must meet some limited standards of humanity in order to be equal, because if people acquire 
different levels of artificially altered “human natures,” the outcome will be stratification, 
irrecuperable inequality and perhaps even class warfare. For this reason, Fukuyama calls for a 
pre-emptive regulation of genetic manipulation so as to avoid a “posthuman future.”  I 
contrast this theory with a selection of transhumanist and feminist theorists as well as with 
examples from fiction, namely the trilogy Lilith´s Brood (1987-1989) by Octavia Butler and 
the novel Never Let Me Go (2005) by Kazuo Ishiguro. Drawing on these sources I conclude 
that Fukuyama´s position is harmfully exclusionary and divisive; and also counter-productive 
in the sense that in his pursuit of securing freedom and equality he renders potential 
posthuman subjects fundamentally inferior, thus principally defeating his own project and 
exposing his bias regarding what constitutes a morally worthy identity and subjectivity. 
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V této práci analyzuji a problematizuji přístup Francise Fukuyamy k posthumanizmu, 
který je vyjádřen převážně v knize Our Posthuman Future (2002). V ní Fukuyama varuje před 
pravděpodobným nepříznivým dopadem potenciální biotechnologické revoluce, která by 
mohla umožnit snadný přístup k manipulaci s lidským genomem, pomocí praktik jako je 
genetická modifikace nebo lidské klonování. Fukuyamův hlavní předpoklad je, že všichni 
členové společnosti musí splňovat jistá ohraničená kritéria humanity k tomu, aby si byli rovni, 
protože když různí lidé nabudou odlišné „lidské přirozenosti,“ výsledkem bude stratifikace, 
nezvrátitelná nerovnost a možná dokonce třídní válka. Z toho důvodu Fukuyama volá po 
preventivní regulaci genetické manipulace, aby se předešlo „posthumanitní budoucnosti.“ 
Tuto teorii dávám do kontrastu s názory vybraných transhumanistických a feministických 
teoretiků. Dále se věnuji beletrii, konkrétně románové trilogii Lilith's Brood (1987-1989) od 
Octavie Butler a románu Never Let Me Go (2005) od Kazua Ishigura. Vycházejíc z těchto 
zdrojů vyvozuji, že Fukuyamova pozice je škodlivě vylučující, rozdělující a 
kontraproduktivní v tom, že ve snaze zajistit svobodu a rovnost vykresluje potenciálně 
posthumánní subjekty jako fundamentálně podřadné, čímž v principu popírá vlastní projekt a 
odhaluje svůj předsudek ohledně toho, co konstituuje morálně cennou identitu a subjektivitu. 
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In his 1989 essay “The End of History?” the cultural theorist and philosopher Francis 
Fukuyama famously declared the end of history in a political and ideological sense, an 
argument which he later expanded in his book The End of History and the Last Man (1992). 
In it, he argues that the natural human condition has made the process of history a 
development towards the most suitable social and political environment, which he has 
declared is liberal democracy. As such, Fukuyama agrees with Hegel that the flow of history 
is purposeful and also that it effectively ended in 1806, when, as a result of the Battle of Jena, 
liberal principles of the Enlightenment were solidified. Since then, no better environment for 
human nature to thrive in has been found and the collapse of Fascism in 1945 and 
Communism in 1989 (which gave an impulse for Fukuyama to write the original article) 
further attest to the conviction that human beings naturally converge towards liberal 
democratic values. 
   Much has happened since in terms of international political relations and conflicts, 
including conflicts in Ukraine, parts of North Africa and the Middle East, the “war on terror” 
and the immigration crisis. Many people, including Samuel Huntington, interpret this global 
turmoil of the recent years as ´the clash of civilizations (which) will dominate global 
politics.´1 After events such as 9/11, and even before, Fukuyama was asked to reconsider his 
thesis as it had been largely criticized,2 but he has remained confident that instead of being 
locked in a cultural struggle, we are facing a backlash against spreading democratic values, a 
´rearguard action that will in time be overwhelmed by the broader tide of modernization.´3  
 However, this generally invoked ´invitation to write a retrospective on the “end of 
history”´4 prompted Fukuyama to recognize an increasingly visible barrier to the contention 
that no countercultural or ideological insurgence can endanger the continuous global 
solidification of liberal democratic values. The issue is biotechnological revolution, 
particularly in the form of possible large-scale genetic alterations of masses of people that in 
his view could have disastrous social consequences. Fukuyama´s reasoning builds directly on 
                                                          
1 Samuel Huntington, “The Clash of Civilizations?” Foreign Affairs Vol. 72, Summer 1993: 1. 
2 Francis Fukuyama, “Second Thoughts: The Last Man in a Bottle,” National Interest, Summer 1999: 4. 
3 Francis Fukuyama, Our Posthuman Future (New York: Picador, 2003) 7. 




his aforementioned Hegelian theory that the particular tenets of liberal democracy are direct 
political expressions of particular features of human nature. Once we have reached this 
political stage, no other system or ideology will seem more attractive because none (so far 
invented) aligns so well with what human needs are. However, that applies only insofar as our 
nature remains intact, for alterations made to human nature may ´move us into a “posthuman” 
stage of history,´5 in which there is no guaranteed causal link between the “posthuman” nature 
and liberal values such as freedom or equality. The fear is, as Bart Simon writes in a review of 
Our Posthuman Future, that genetic modifications may ´alter the material and biological basis 
of the natural human equality that serves as the basis of political equality and human rights.´6  
 Fukuyama is by no means the first to discuss the risks of genetic engineering and of 
the possibility to alter the human body to the extent where the notion of the human would, for 
an increasing lack of meaning, eventually have to give way to an “updated” term posthuman. 
Cultural theory and social philosophy have been increasingly productive on the topic of 
posthumanism since the 1990s and have included authors and philosophers such as Jurgen 
Habermas, Hans Moravec, Cary Wolfe, Katherine Hayles, Donna Haraway and others. 
Besides theory, the subject of the effects of genetic engineering and the nature of posthuman 
societies also thrives in contemporary fiction, and is present in the writing of authors such as 
Kazuo Ishiguro, Margaret Atwood, Octavia Butler, Ursula Le Guin and many others. 
Fiction dedicated to exploring posthumanism often has utopian or dystopian 
undertones and tends to balance somewhere along the continuum between the two contrasting 
subgenres of speculative fiction. Posthuman utopias have often centred around a changed 
condition surrounding the issues of gender, oppression and social roles of the sexes, such as in 
Joanna Russ´ The Female Man (1975), Charlotte Perkins Gilman´s Herland (1915) or Woman 
on the Edge of Time (1976) written by Marge Piercy. In contrast, the prevalent trend of 
dystopian fiction has progressed from Orwellian political dystopias to the current stage, where 
it is not the political system but the posthuman condition that causes the misery surrounding 
the characters. Although the still most famous posthuman dystopia dates back to 1932 when 
Aldous Huxley published Brave New World, it is only since about a quarter of a century ago 
when the writing of posthuman dystopian or (less frequently) utopian fiction, as well as its 
counterpart cultural theory, dramatically gained on frequency. One can perhaps venture to 
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explain this thematic shift by pointing out the existing concerns with the increasing 
technologization of society and the fear of its derogatory future impact on human lives (a fear 
enunciated, among others, already in a 1909 short story “The Machine Stops” by E.M. 
Forster), but whatever the reason, it remains true that contemporary fiction and cultural theory 
with a posthumanist subject-matter have been largely informed by the dystopian horizons 
modelled according to a possible use and misuse of biotechnology.  
Fukuyama´s writing on posthumanism has to be understood as being part of a complex 
net of intertwining, often contradictory theories, ideas, predictions and arguments whose 
common aim is to shed light on what may become the dominant topic of the 21st century, 
namely the ethical and political effects of an open possibility to radically change the human 
subject by means of biotechnological intervention. The aim of this thesis is to analyze 
Fukuyama´s theory about this disposition, in the light of an emerging theoretical and literary 
corpus that deals with this topic. The argumentative structure of Our Posthuman Future will 
be followed in this thesis but at each step of the way Fukuyama´s arguments will be 
challenged by a wider context. His conclusions will also be put into perspective not only with 
theory but also with several texts of posthuman, arguably dystopian fiction, namely the trilogy 
of novels Lilith´s Brood (1987-1989) by Octavia Butler and Never Let Me Go (2005) by 
Kazuo Ishiguro. These texts not only provide a thoughtful illustration of many emerging 
worries connected with posthumanism but also express a number of solid philosophical and 
political arguments that are apt to challenge the validity of Fukuyama´s views on the subject. 
As such the fiction will be used as a counterweight to his thesis, in order contextualize or 
problematize the tenet or reasoning at hand.         
 Before a comprehensive analysis of Fukuyama´s specific arguments can be carried 
out, some essential terms, namely the very term posthumanism as well as human nature, have 
to be defined and put into a historical and philosophical perspective, because their meaning is 
crucial when handled by Fukuyama as well as by his peers writing on this topic. After that, his 
core arguments will be analyzed and challenged. The last section of this thesis will be 
dedicated to the analysis of the aforementioned novels, which will provide further evidence as 








Chapter 1: What is posthumanism? 
 
While the term posthumanism was largely popularized in cultural theory and 
philosophy in the early 1990s, the word and its broader definition already appeared on several 
occasions earlier in the 20th century and before. Neil Badmington writes in Alien Chic: 
Posthumanism and the Other Within (2004) that ´there is nothing new about the concept of 
posthumanism,´7 since writers such as H.P. Blavatsky already wrote of ´the post-Human´ in 
the late 19th century, even though, according to The Routledge Companion to Literature and 
Science (2011),  he ´did not develop a detailed theory of the posthuman.´8   
In 1966, Michel Foucault wrote in The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the 
Human Sciences: ´As archaeology of our thought easily shows, man is an invention of recent 
date. And one perhaps nearing its end.´9 Here Foucault not only anticipates the end of what 
we commonly mean when referring to the terms “man” or “human” but also implies that the 
nature of this thing called “human” has never been stable in the first place, much less 
involving an unchanging, eternal definition of what makes us who we are. Similar argument 
may be found in Ihab Hassan´s 1977 article “Prometheus as Performer: Toward a 
Posthumanist Culture?” in which, according to Posthumanism: A Critical Analysis (2013), 
critics ´locate the first critical use of ´post-humanism.´´10 In this post-modern take on the 
ancient myth Hassan´s character Prometheus announces an emergent posthumanist culture. At 
one point Prometheus declares: ´We need to understand that five hundred years of humanism 
may be coming to an end, as humanism transforms itself into something that we must 
helplessly call posthumanism.´11 This anticipation of a change of paradigm, as well as 
Foucault´s assertion of flexibility and volatility of the meaning of “human” helped later form 
                                                          
7 Neil Badmington, Alien Chic: Posthumanism and the Other Within (New York: Routledge, 2004) 87. 
8 Bruce Clarke and Manuela Rossini, The Routledge Companion to Literature and Science (London: Routledge, 
2011) 376. 
9 Michel Foucault, The Order of Things: An Archaeology of Human Sciences (New York: Pantheon, 1971) 387. 
10 Stefan Herbrechter, Posthumanism: A Critical Analysis (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2013) 34. 
11 Ihab Hassan, “Prometheus as Performer: Toward a Postmodern Culture?” Performance in Postmodern 




a specific strand within posthumanism called transhumanism, the proponents of which 
encourage this change and transformation with great enthusiasm. 
 When posthumanism as a field of study became firmly rooted in the scientific and 
academic discourse during the 1990s, posthumanism became an umbrella term for a number 
of theoretical concepts that permeate academic disciplines such as sociology, political 
sciences, cultural theory, technology, biology and bioethics, to the extent in which these 
disciplines discuss the issue of a radical change in the human condition and its various forms 
of impact. According to Francesca Ferrando´s article “Posthumanism, Transhumanism, 
Antihumanism, Metahumanism, and New Materialisms Differences and Relations” (2013), 
posthumanism has most frequently been understood as a gateway term to address the ´urgency 
for the integral redefinition of the notion of the human, following the onto-epistemological as 
well as scientific and bio-technological developments of the twentieth and twenty-first 
centuries.´12 As such, posthumanism seems to constitute a space in which ideas that are spread 
across various disciplines interplay, rather than forming a monolithic, ideologically rooted 
position itself. 
 In contrast, transhumanism is an ideological strand within the broad category of 
posthumanism. Perhaps the most concise and lucid explanation of the notion, including all its 
contemporary connotations and aims of its proponents, was presented and defended in a 
manifesto named Transhumanist Declaration, crafted in 1998 by a group of international 
authors, scientists and philosophers such as David Pearce or Nick Bostrom.13 According to the 
manifesto, transhumanism is a theory which considers the posthuman condition to be a 
necessary step forward in the human evolution, but a step brought about by human 
intervention rather than evolution by natural selection. In this respect the transhumanists have 
no small goals. According to the first tenet of the declaration, their hope is to achieve ´the 
possibility of broadening human potential by overcoming aging, cognitive shortcomings, 
involuntary suffering, and our confinement to planet Earth.´14 Unsurprisingly, technology is 
of crucial importance for transhumanism, whether it be in order to control our environment or 
to alter or enhance the human body. According to Ferrando ´human enhancement is a crucial 
                                                          
12 Francesca Ferrando, “Posthumanism, Transhumanism, Antihumanism, Metahumanism, and New Materialisms 
Differences and Relations,” Existenz, Vol. 8, Fall 2013: 26. 
13 Michael Hauskeller, “Utopia in Trans- and Posthumanism,” Academia.edu, Jan. 2013: 3. 




notion to the transhumanist reflection; the main keys to access such a goal are identified in 
science and technology.´15 The problem, however, is that science and technology are in 
transhumanism regarded with a noncritical adoration and with barely any trait of cautionary 
carefulness. 
 Understanding the problematic relationship between transhumanism and technology 
requires looking back at the predecessors of this particular strand of posthumanism. As 
Bostrom argues in an essay “A History of Transhuman Thought” (2005), transhumanism and 
its belief in the capacity of human perfectibility are directly linked with the ideals inherited 
from Renaissance humanism and the Enlightenment, which, through its representatives such 
as the philosopher Francis Bacon, advocated ´the project of “effecting all things possible,” by 
which he meant using science to achieve mastery over nature in order to improve the living 
condition of human beings.´16 The ideals of Renaissance humanism thus went in a vein of 
striving to break free from the prejudices and ideological restrains of the Middle Ages and of 
using all available intellectual and physical powers to perfect oneself and push the boundaries 
of what one can achieve indefinitely.  
However, in his 1984 essay “Sapere Aude” (“What is Enlightenment?”) Michel 
Foucault calls for avoidance of a confusion between the Enlightenment and humanism. In his 
mind humanism, at least since the 17th century, has been making the same error which it had 
originally formed as a backlash against. Namely, as Foucault says, humanism ´has been 
obliged to lean on certain conceptions of man borrowed from religion, science, or politics.´17 
As Cary Wolfe expands the argument in his reading of Foucault in the book What is 
Posthumanism (2010), ´what Foucault draws attention to (…) is that humanism is (…) its own 
dogma, replete with its own prejudices and assumptions, which are themselves a form of 
“superstition” from which the Enlightenment sought to break free.´18 Humanism is thus said 
to have lost track of its own original mission and started clinging to doctrines it once sought to 
get rid of. This contradiction then creates paradoxes, such as the one of social Darwinism. 
According to Wolfe, the humanist (and consequently transhumanist) problem with social 
Darwinism is that its method of extracting humanity from animality is by means of an 
                                                          
15 Ferrando 27. 
16 Nick Bostrom, “A History of Transhuman Thought,” Journal of Evolution and Technology, 14 (2005): 2. 
17 Paul Rabinow, ed. The Foucault Reader (New York: Pantheon Books, 1984) 44. 




enhancement – eugenics, which is said to be a form of human mastery over nature. However, 
the method to do so falls inside the territory of natural selection (survival of the fittest), and is 
thus decidedly naturalistic and uncontrollable. As such, we are left with ´an “animal” 
competition between the different degrees of humanity.´19   
Transhumanism thus faces a historical problem of failing to adhere to its radically 
progressive definition by relying on the notion of individuality and progressivity as an 
unquestioned dogma. This has arguably translated into what transhumanism has been 
criticized for in recent years, namely its unconditional adoration of technology and the lack of 
critical approach towards progression, enhancement and alteration.   
One of the modern writers who popularized the concept of posthumanism was the 
feminist writer with demonstrably transhumanist outlooks Donna Haraway, even though she 
never used either of the two terms herself. As Ferrando writes, ´the posthuman turn was fully 
enacted by feminist theorists in the Nineties,´20 and it was Haraway who initiated this turn in 
1983 when she published an essay called “A Cyborg Manifesto.” The essay gained a lot of 
attention due to Haraway´s sweeping criticism of the perception of humanity as a rigid, 
unchanging concept as well as for her criticism of traditional feminism for its focus on 
identity politics. Haraway set the modern definitions of how the transhuman strand of 
posthumanism later perceived the human condition. She aimed to refute the idea that human 
nature remains intact regardless of external factors and she argued that due to the 20th 
century´s technological advance the line between artificiality and nature had already been 
blurred. According to her, modern-day people are cyborgs, in other words indiscernible 
constructs of human and machine. ´By the late twentieth century (…) we are all chimeras, 
theorized and fabricated hybrids of machine and organism.´21 Although written in a playful, 
sometimes provocative form, Haraway´s concern is clear: to de-essentialize the notion of 
human nature and to rid it off binary oppositions that have accompanied humanism ever since 
its inception, such as human/animal, physical/non-physical, human/non-human, and 
ultimately the opposition between the technology and the self. This move can be understood 
as the essence of the transhumanist philosophy which seeks freedom from old concepts 
                                                          
19 Wolfe xiv.  
20 Ferrando 29.  




surrounding the notion of humanism that may impede people from progress towards greater 
well-being achieved by the (technological) means of self-enhancement. 
Katherine Hayles in her book How We Became Posthuman (2000) understands the 
territory of posthumanism to be occupied by beings very similar to Haraway´s cyborgs. In her 
view ´the posthuman implies not only a coupling with intelligent machines but coupling so 
intense (…) that it is no longer possible to distinguish between the biological organism and 
the informational circuits in which the organism is enmeshed.´22 In other words, Hayles 
moves the rather metaphorical definition of a cyborg created by Haraway to the contemporary 
space in which the literal manifestation of the cyborg as a future reality seems more plausible 
than ever. According to Joel Dinerstein, who wrote a review of Hayles´ book, all the 
inclinations towards ´what even cautious critics call “social revolution”´23 are already in 
place, including the cultural belief in the omnipotence of technology as well as the consumer 
desire for self-enhancement. As a result, ´steroids, cloning, gene mapping, and surgical 
implants are just the tip of an iceberg that, when it melts, will rebaptize human beings as 
cyborgs.´24 
The transhumanists consider posthumanism to be a necessary theoretical possibility 
whose existence reassures an individual´s freedom of self-alteration and self-enhancement. 
Equality and freedom in the choice and attainability of the biotechnological possibilities are 
also a crucial principle for the transhumanists. As James Hughes writes in Citizen Cyborg: 
Why Democratic Societies Must Respond to the Redesigned Human of the Future (2004), 
´transhumanism calls for an equal access to technological enhancements, which could 
otherwise be limited to certain socio-political classes and related to economic power, 
consequently encoding racial and sexual politics.´25 One can argue that since transhumanism 
is through writers such as Haraway conceptually aligned with the feminist movement, i.e. 
movement that recognizes (and aims to eradicate) historically rooted oppression of social 
minorities, its proponents never considered humanism as a guarantor for social and political 
equality in the first place, and may therefore perceive a possible abolition of the transhumanist 
                                                          
22 Katherine Hayles, How We Became Posthuman (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1999) 35. 
23 Joel Dinerstein, “Technology and Its Discontents: On the Verge of the Posthuman,” American Quarterly, 58:3 
(September 2006): 570. 
24 Dinerstein 570. 




aspirations also as a threat, as a barrier to a necessary social and political progress towards 
greater welfare for all.  
As opposed to Haraway and Hayles, Fukuyama considers human nature to be a 
relatively stable concept and he therefore clearly distinguishes between the human and the 
posthuman. In contrast with the transhumanists, being human in his view is almost a sacred 
territory, a necessary condition to maintain social and political stability. Therefore, the very 
concept of the posthuman is a threat. Fukuyama represents a more conservative approach to 
the wonders of science, and he is considerably skeptical about the prospects that the 
posthuman phase might bring about if it were to supersede the human one on a 
biotechnological basis. In the essay where he introduced the threat of posthumanism (as well 
as the term itself), called “Second Thoughts: The Last Man in a Bottle” (1999), Fukuyama 
writes that a ´condition for the End of History, (…) is an end of science.´26 The “End of 
History” is for Fukuyama of course the optimistic notion that there is no long-term moving 
beyond the stage of liberal democracy. The potential abuse of science, though, is what may 
very well demolish this grand historical project and it thus prompted Fukuyama to write this 
article and later the book as a cautionary warning.  
The thesis of “Second Thoughts: The Last Man in a Bottle” is that the misuse of 
biotechnology is in its effects parallel, though much more potent, to the oppressive ideologies 
of the human history. ´Biotechnology will be able to accomplish what the radical ideologies 
of the past, with their unbelievably crude techniques, were unable to accomplish: to bring 
about a new type of human being.´27 By this Fukuyama means that ideologies such as fascism 
or communism applied social restrictions in order to contain or displace some unwanted, yet 
widespread expressions and desires of the people, whether it be inclinations towards private 
possession or freedom of movement. These restrictions, though, have always been applied 
externally, silencing various human desires but not extinguishing their source. As a result, 
political totalitarian regimes have a tendency to collapse at some point, when the resistance 
manages to gather in sufficient force. The effects of biotechnology, however, are much more 
subtle. Changing human nature in some radical way (and perhaps only a certain segment of 
the population) may mean that society will become intrinsically unequal, not because of a 
                                                          
26 Fukuyama, “Second Thoughts: The Last Man In A Bottle” 14. 




tyrannical dictator but because of the absence of a common denominator, namely human 
nature as we know it that would eventually ensure equality and freedom. 
Fukuyama, in fact, does not spend as much time defining the concept of 
posthumanism in Our Posthuman Future as he is defining the concept of human nature. The 
difference in the vantage point between him and the transhumanists is that for the former the 
field of opportunity lies in what the social expression of human nature has to offer, while the 
latter see the opportunity in the exploitation of the posthuman stage. Human nature is in the 
transhumanist philosophy a fluid concept. The Renaissance humanists transformed it and 
now, given the opportunity, biotechnology may and should as well. To Fukuyama, however, 
preserving human nature is of crucial importance. For this reason, the particular dangers of 
posthumanism as seen by Fukuyama can be fully analyzed and critiqued only after his 
definition of human nature has been understood including all its relevant historical and 























Chapter 2: Fukuyama´s definition of human nature 
 
Before defining human nature, Fukuyama guides the reader through a short survey of 
the history of philosophy in order to demonstrate that human rights are justifiably derived 
from human nature. By holding this position he is in fact arguing against cultural relativists, 
who on an empirical basis claim that different cultures have different sets of rights and values, 
as well as against a more theoretical line of reasoning that exists ´under the label of 
naturalistic fallacy, a tradition that stretches from David Hume to twentieth-century analytical 
philosophers such as G.E. Moore, R.M. Hare, and others.´28 Hume´s distinction between “is” 
and “ought” is probably still the most popular way of phrasing the naturalistic fallacy 
argument. According to him the category of “is” is descriptive, as it simply comments on the 
current state of reality, while the category of “ought” means suddenly injecting this amoral 
reality with a normative precept. In A Treatise of Human Nature (1738) Hume writes: ´this 
ought or ought not express some new relation or affirmation, (and it) seems altogether 
unconceivable, how this new relation can be a deduction from others, which are entirely 
different from it.´29 In response to this widely established theoretical principle Fukuyama 
concedes that moral truths might not be deducible a priori from empirical observation but that 
there is nevertheless a common behaviour that links certain types of situations with certain 
types of action, i.e. behaviour whose common goal for most people is, for instance, well-
being. According to Sam Harris, a contemporary moral philosopher, values, or in other words 
moral extractions of an “ought” from an “is,” ´only exist relative to actual or potential 
changes in the well-being of conscious creatures. (…) For instance, to say that we ought to 
treat children with kindness seems identical to saying that everyone will tend to be better off 
if we do.´30 Harris´ point is a profoundly utilitarian one, for it identifies moral goodness with 
well-being, and at this point Fukuyama sides with him, because he shares the conviction that 
human nature craves specific objectives such as well-being, happiness or health, which 
objectively “ought” to be fulfilled, simply because they are a part of behaviour that is 
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29 David Hume, A Treatise on Human Nature, Project Gutenberg, 13 Feb. 2016 
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common across the human race. Fukuyama then parts with the utilitarians, whom he accuses 
of ´radical reductionism – that is, the overly simplified view of human nature.´31 In other 
words, Fukuyama and the utilitarians agree that human nature produces desires for ends that 
people tend to have in common, from which it follows that these ends objectively ought to be 
pursued; their difference lies in conflicting definitions of what constitutes human nature.  
Fukuyama goes beyond the utilitarians in saying that what drives the “ought” is a set 
of complex emotional responses and not just a simple pursuit of pleasure or happiness, which 
utilitarians such as Jeremy Bentham would have believed. According to Fukuyama, every 
“good” and “bad” is either accompanied or born out of a strong emotion, which means that 
´the process of value derivations is not fundamentally a rational one, because its sources are 
the “is” of the emotions.´32 This claim may seem to be reminiscent of Hume who also 
maintained that emotions are the main drivers of what is commonly understood as moral 
reasoning, but Hume argued to the effect that moral reasoning therefore has no objective 
value because in reality it is only a subjective expression of one´s emotional preference. 
However, Fukuyama´s reading of both Locke and Hume implies that both philosophers fail to 
recognize certain universal tendencies that human beings share. While in Locke it is some 
common preconditions of the human brain, in Hume it is some shared threads of moral 
behaviour that exist in individuals and is, by extension, represented by social and political 
arrangements. Fukuyama´s argument is that generation of emotions that guide moral 
behaviour is rooted in a common human nature and is therefore not distributed randomly or 
merely as a result of an impact of culture. Therefore, while emotions are felt subjectively, 
their distribution is patterned as they are produced by the brain and its uniquely human 
qualities. This can be also traced to some universally shared features of different communities 
and societies. For instance, ´the moral opprobrium that attaches to murder is due in large 
measure to the fact that the fear of death is part of human nature and does not vary 
substantially from one human community to another.´33 Therefore, even though murder is 
universal, laws against murder are also universal, as they are a result of the universal moral 
sense, which, while subjective in character, is largely uniform in application. 
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Fukuyama´s take on human nature aligns to a large extent with that of the cultural 
theorist and philosopher Jurgen Habermas, who also argues that moral sense is universal as a 
defining quality of human nature and that it underlines essential features permeating all 
cultures. Habermas defines a “species-ethic,” which is a set of ´intuitive self-descriptions that 
guide our own self-identifications as human beings – that is, our self-understanding as 
members of the species.´34 The social and political values that people have are a reflection of 
this species-ethics, namely in terms of how we perceive and, as a result, value, cooperate and 
judge each other as members of the same species. Like Fukuyama, Habermas concedes that 
various cultures are different but ´the vision different cultures have of “man” (…) is 
everywhere the same.´35 While different cultures may vary in their interpretations of the world 
and the human´s place in it, according to Habermas they nevertheless tend to converge on a 
“minimal ethical self-understanding of the species,” which provides a common basis for 
morality, laws and procedural justice. This minimal self-understanding involves seeing 
ourselves as autonomous, ´ethically free and morally equal beings guided by norms and 
reasons.´36 Habermas understands this to be the reason our social arrangements tend to 
preserve the autonomy of individuals by defending their right of self-determination and 
limiting possible impositions on their freedom as moral agents by others. This species-ethic, 
the minimal self-understanding of others as beings fundamentally equal by belonging to the 
same species, being persons of equal birth and having the capacity to be autonomous authors 
of their own lives, is what underlines human nature, and Habermas is concerned about saving 
it from the reaches of biotechnology as much as Fukuyama, even though their definitions of 
what constitutes human nature differ. While Habermas does not perceive moral sense to be as 
much emotion-driven as Fukuyama, they both are optimistic about the direct link between 
human nature and perceived natural equality of people, which a biotechnological modification 
of future generations can permanently threaten. 
Fukuyama´s definition of human nature, then, is as follows: ´ Human nature is the sum 
of the behavior and characteristics that are typical of the human species, arising from genetic 
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rather than environmental factors.´37 Firstly, behaviour that is typical of a species means in 
this context what ethologists refer to as a species-typical behaviour, which, according to 
Comparative Psychology: A Handbook (1998) may be defined as ´behaviour that occurs in a 
similar fashion in nearly all members of a species.´38 Here, the term “typical” allows for 
variance of behaviours or characteristics rather than defining a single model. Thus, ´there is 
no such thing as a “species-typical” height, only a species-typical distribution of heights.´39 
For every characteristic there is a median and a mean, which are tools that are very telling in 
determining what the species-typical feature is. This is important to note because even though 
there are phenotypes of any species including human that possess an overdeveloped feature or 
lack the feature completely, that does not mean that the feature is not species-typical. In 
humans, for instance, a complex communication system – language – is decisively a species-
typical feature, and the fact that some people do not possess this ability does not exclude 
language from qualities that are species-typical. 
 In the age-old philosophical dispute about what the role of nurture versus nature in 
forming the human self is, the species-typical theory represents a naturalistic position in the 
sense that it ascribes inborn predispositions to individuals, most of which tend to develop and 
guide their behaviour over the course of their life. These predispositions may involve catering 
for the offspring, repulsion to suffering, various emotional responses to certain situations, etc. 
In humans, whose nurture mechanisms (i.e. culture) are obviously more developed than in any 
other species, these predispositions may be developed, repressed, reshaped or redirected but 
they will nonetheless be there, simply for the virtue of the individual being a member of the 
human species. This line of thinking, however, has its long established adversaries. The most 
notorious, perhaps, is the philosopher John Locke, who maintained that there are no 
predispositions or innate ideas to the human mind. In his famous Essay Concerning Human 
Understanding (1690) he writes that the mind is a ´white paper void of all characters, without 
any ideas. How comes it to be furnished? Whence has it all the materials of reason and 
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knowledge? To this I answer, in one word, from experience.´40 In other words, all that the 
human mind knows is through nurture, without which the mind is just like a white paper, 
tabula rasa, or as Fukuyama puts it, ´a kind of general-purpose computer that can take in and 
manipulate the sensory data that appear to it.´41 
 Even though the species-typical behaviour theory is much more recent than the 
nurture-favouring theory of John Locke, there seems to be a sort of a revival of the tabula 
rasa concept within the contemporary gender studies, as much of its writing emphasizes the 
prevalent role of culture over nature in forming the individual self, including its innermost 
impulses. For instance, Judith Butler, one of the pioneers of contemporary gender studies, 
claims that even sex and gender are cultural rather than biological categories. In Bodies That 
Matter (1993) she writes that ´”sex” is a regulatory ideal whose materialization (…) takes 
place through certain highly regulated (social) practices.´42 Fukuyama recognizes this trend 
but dismisses its refusal to acknowledge any relevant biological distinctions between the 
sexes. He argues, referring to neurological studies in evolutionary biology, such as to Donald 
Symons´ book The Evolution of Human Sexuality (1979), that both male and female brains 
´have been shaped by differing requirements of evolutionary adaptation.´43   
Fukuyama deconstructs Locke´s argument in a similar manner. Referring to various 
discoveries in cognitive neuroscience and psychology he concludes that the brain is ´a 
modular organ full of highly adapted cognitive structures, most of them unique to the human 
species,´44 and consequently translates Locke´s vague notion of “innate ideas” to a more 
workable language “species-typical emotional responses to cognition.” If we therefore 
conclude that a developed brain is indeed predisposed in a certain way to produce a species-
typical behaviour, what is, finally, the species-typical behaviour of humans? According to 
Fukuyama there are unique ´ways in which we perceive, learn, and develop intellectually. 
Human beings have their own mode of cognition, which is different from that of apes and 
dolphins´45 By this special mode of cognition Fukuyama means a similar set of mechanisms 
                                                          
40 John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding (Pennsylvania: The Penn State University Press, 
1999) 87. 
41 Fukuyama, Our Posthuman Future 88. 
42 Judith Butler, Bodies That Matter (New York: Routledge, 1993) 1. 
43 Fukuyama, Our Posthuman Future 27. 
44 Fukuyama, Our Posthuman Future 87. 




to what Immanuel Kant called the transcendental unity of apperception: the a priori ways of 
arranging and giving sense to perception such as attributing causality, and locating objects in 
space and time, to which Fukuyama adds others, like the ways humans ´engage in reciprocity, 
pursue revenge, feel embarrassment, feel repulsion for incest and cannibalism.´46 Apart from 
the complexity of perception, there are other characteristics that individuals share across the 
human race. In his Politics, Aristotle famously states that ´man is by nature a political 
animal.´47 Aristotle explains that the fact that people are naturally sociable and have a 
tendency to create and engage in political organizations is because they have a highly 
developed language, which humans uniquely use to signal ideas much more complex than 
merely expressing primal instincts such as pain or pleasure. Aristotle further adds that ´man 
alone has any sense of good and evil, of just and unjust.´48 Fukuyama recognizes all these 
patterns of behaviour, namely particularities of human perception, possession of language, 
culture, and a moral sense as species-typical forms of behaviour that humans evolved to have 
and to be partially defined by.  
However, Fukuyama admits that even though in the past all aforementioned features 
were believed to be uniquely human, we have recently come to understand that there are some 
nonhuman species that share to some extent all these forms of behaviour. Chimpanzees for 
instance are able to learn parts of sign language, they have political struggles including 
struggle for recognition, and they have ´the ability to transmit learned behaviors across 
generations through nongenetic means,´49 hence the ability to maintain a rudimentary form of 
culture. It thus seems that the human-specific behaviour is not so unique after all and that an 
attempt to draw a line around human behaviour in order to point out what needs to be 
protected from biotechnology, as Fukuyama does, may seem to be eligible to be criticized as 
speciesist, a term popularized by the bioethicist Peter Singer. In his 1975 book Animal 
Liberation, Singer defines speciesism as ´a prejudice or attitude of bias in favour of the 
interests of members of one´s own species and against those of members of other species.´50 
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Singer, a hard-line utilitarian, argues that there is an unjustifiable bias in speciesism to 
disregard the relevance of life and suffering of animals merely for not belonging to the human 
species. In this respect speciesism is imagined to be conceptually similar to racism or sexism 
in that different values and rights are ascribed to the in-group members than to out-group 
members even though both groups share the capacity to pain and suffering.  
Fukuyama, however, maintains that it is of crucial importance to separate humans and 
animals when it comes to natural rights, and that it is this very separation that ensures equality 
between all human beings. According to him all the different characteristics of people ranging 
from skin colour and natural talents to gender and sexual orientation will have been made 
nonessential to the distribution of human rights as long as we postulate the existence of an 
essential human trait that all people share, which will secure our unconditional equality. 
Fukuyama calls this trait Factor X and defines it as an ´essential human quality underneath 
(accidental human characteristics) that is worthy of a certain minimal level of respect.´51 The 
political consequence of possessing Factor X is having one´s human rights protected, being 
equal to others regardless of accidental characteristics such as race, gender, IQ or sexual 
orientation, being able to vote (if adult), etc.   
The recognition of Factor X was throughout history always limited to a group of 
people and never to all, as was (and is) demonstrably true in all forms of slavery. In fact, 
Fukuyama argues that it is only in the modern form of liberal democracy where the Factor X 
is acknowledged to be possessed by every human being. Without postulating the Factor X one 
could perhaps avoid being called a speciesist but would risk being exposed to inter-human 
discrimination. To clarify Fukuyama´s point, let us take the following example. Responding 
to a homophobe who has no regard for gay people, one could say that despite our difference 
in sexual orientation, we all are nevertheless equally human in a deeper sense, and should 
therefore be treated equally. As Fukuyama says, ´we don’t all need to be the same in order to 
have rights—but we need to be the same in some one critical respect in order to have equal 
rights.´52 The usage of the term human in a response to a homophobe (or a racist or sexist) 
refers to precisely this one critical respect in which human equality is rooted, i.e. the Factor X, 
a set of essential human characteristics which unites humans into a single moral category.  
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What, then, is the Factor X? As we have seen, it is not merely language or culture or 
moral sense, because to some extent we share these with some nonhumans. Merely finding 
human-specific behaviour and capabilities will not do because they do not grant the 
uniqueness of human nature. For Fukuyama, therefore, it is the complexity of all these highly 
developed human features that builds a gap between humans and nonhumans. As he writes, 
´Factor X cannot be reduced to the possession of moral choice, or reason, or language, or 
sociability, or sentience, or emotions, or consciousness, or any other quality (…), it is all of 
these qualities coming together in a human whole.´53 Fukuyama´s conclusion as to what 
makes us uniquely human is that the high complexity and sheer number of the human-specific 
cognitive and social abilities simply cannot be compared to a much less developed species-
typical behaviour of other species, even if the grain of some of the human behaviour can be 
found elsewhere in nature (mostly in other hominids). 
In basing human rights in human nature, Fukuyama is effectively assuming an 
ontological gap between human nature and the nature of other species. One of the reasons for 
doing so, as Fukuyama argues has been done in the Bill of Rights and most constitutions of 
democratic societies, is to avoid discrimination between humans based on nonessential 
characteristics. In fact, without this ontological gap it would be very difficult to provide a 
theoretical refutation of ideologies such as social Darwinism, because ´if there is a continuum 
of gradations between human and nonhuman, there is a continuum within the type of human 
as well.´54  
Thus, the essential idea behind the ontological gap concept is that humans are 
fundamentally different from other species. Perhaps at some point during the course of human 
evolution a leap in development occurred, based on which the complex whole that the human 
is today cannot be accounted simply by tracing back the commonly understood little steps of 
the evolutionary process. However, it is not that Fukuyama is ascribing any supernatural 
quality to human nature, his aim in fact is to attack the widespread scientific method called 
methodological reductionism whose attitude towards human beings as merely towards a more 
developed form of biological organism is falsely seen as an exhaustive enough scientific 
approach to unravel what it means to be human.  
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Scientific reductionism as a method traces everything back to prior material causes. 
Fukuyama is critical of it for its unfaltering classification of everything as objective, 
observable and calculable phenomena and for its stringent insistence on handling biological 
mechanisms, most importantly human beings, in the same terms, because it fails to explain the 
emotional, intellectual and cognitive complexity of human nature. As Fukuyama states ´the 
problem with this kind of thinking is not that it is necessarily false but that it is insufficient to 
explain many of the most salient and unique human traits.´55  
In fact, there are established contemporary scientists and philosophers who share 
Fukuyama´s criticism of reductionism as an insufficient method to deal with human biological 
and mental processes and nowhere is this insufficiency more evident and openly conceded 
than in the study of the human mind. John Searle, an influential philosopher of language and 
mind has argued that the contemporary scientific discourse is in its approach to consciousness 
trapped in a false dichotomy, according to which all natural phenomena have to be understood 
as consisting of objectively perceptible particles, and when they cannot be explained in these 
objective terms, then the subject of scientific enquiry becomes a non-subject, a misleading 
concept unfit for scientific study. Searle has accused another philosopher of mind, Daniel 
Dennett, precisely of this methodological error. In their rather extensive exchange following 
the publication of Searle´s book The Mystery of Consciousness (1990) he wrote: ´In his book, 
Consciousness Explained, Dennett denies the existence of consciousness. He continues to use 
the word, but he means something different by it.´56 Then, in The Rediscovery of the Mind 
(1992), Searle claims that science has applied two types of scientific reductionism on mind: 
causal reductionism and ontological reductionism. Searle sees the two as related because ´in 
general in the history of science, successful causal reductions tend to lead to ontological 
reductions.57 According to causal reductionism thoughts and subjective feelings are somehow 
caused by the neurological firings in the brain. Ontological reductionism, which is the one 
Searle (and Fukuyama) criticizes, claims that ´objects of certain type can be shown to consist 
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in nothing but objects of other types.´58 The problem, according to Searle, is that while the 
causal reductionism is clearly true, the ontological reductionism misinterprets the nature of 
mind because it ignores subjectivity as its key component. As such, ontological reductionism 
tends to falsely translate feelings and thoughts, ranging from the most basic ones such as pain 
to advanced mental and emotional processes behind complex choice-making, as identical to 
neural firings. However, this is true only causally, not ontologically. Attempting to explain 
pain by pointing to brainwaves means completely missing what subjective feeling of pain is. 
No objective description of a mental event comes close to truly explaining the subjective 
character of that event, just like objective explanation of the refraction of light does not begin 
to intimate what it is like to see red colour. Searle´s conclusion, therefore, is that while 
consciousness is a natural product of the human brain (or rather its advanced feature), it is 
nevertheless a unique phenomenon in that it is an ´irreducible feature of physical reality.´59 
The basic argument of scientific reductionism is that every system is just a sum of its 
parts. Fukuyama aims to refute the application of this theory to human nature because 
according to him the combination of the highly complex human intellectual and emotional 
gamut cannot be accounted by the sum of the evolutionary steps that lead to the emergence of 
the human species. According to him even though ´all of the nonhuman precursors of these 
human traits existed in evolutionary history, (they) collectively add up to much less than the 
human whole.´60 In one particular instance, the complexity of human behaviour, especially 
that on a higher social and political level, is impossible to explain or predict just by 
understanding the causality of the neural firings in the brain. In a similar fashion to Fukuyama 
and Searle, Thomas Nagel argues for the irreducibility of consciousness in his famous essay 
“What Is it Like to Be a Bat?” (1974). Notably, Nagel includes all conscious creatures, not 
only humans, in his declaration that an organism is immune to the reductionist method as long 
as ´there is something that it is like for the organism to be itself.´61 According to Nagel, 
modern science has no tools at the moment to understand consciousness because of its elusive 
subjective nature.  
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Both Searle and Fukuyama would therefore agree that humans are wholes that amount 
to more than just a sum of its objectively observable biological parts. Even though most of the 
human traits are present elsewhere in nature (though in less developed forms), it is their 
simultaneous interplay that creates the kind of highly complex consciousness that is able to 
produce values, which are based on the species-typical emotional and intellectual responses 
that are subsequently consolidated by culture. This uniquely human mental and behavioural 
complexity therefore represents the first stage of a value-making process and for this reason 
Fukuyama deems it worthy of protection. Fukuyama names this protection-worthy ability 
“human dignity.” Therefore, ´what gives us dignity and a moral status higher than that of 
other living creatures is related to the fact that we are complex wholes.´62 In other words, 
human dignity is the ability to derive moral axioms from human nature and is in itself a 
product of human nature´s uniquely great complexity. As such, dignity is the precondition for 
the existence of human rights and it therefore has to be protected from biotechnological 
intervention and preserved in its current status.    
In conclusion to this chapter, Fukuyama´s argumentative framework puts two crucial 
terms in a causal connection, that of human nature and human rights, claiming that the latter is 
derived directly from the former, and calling the capability of such a connection human 
dignity. Thus, in order to show how societies can preserve equal human rights while possibly 
coming into the age of biotechnological opportunities, Fukuyama has to show that there is 
such a thing as human nature, and also that there is uniqueness to it. This human uniqueness is 
a point that Fukuyama has to make in order to fend off the social Darwinist tendencies to 
regard humans as simply developed animals with no objectively justifiable desire for equality 
and universal human rights, as well as the reductionist tendencies that ascribe no special value 
to human complexity, thereby ignoring the link between human nature and moral sense.  
For this reason Fukuyama embarks on a historical survey of different philosophical 
approaches to human nature, only to arrive at a conclusion that it is only humans, due to a 
significant gap of development between them and other species, who have evolved to possess 
a comprehensible moral sense capable of generating universal values and incorporating them 
into the social and political establishments. For this reason the engine behind this capability 
has to be protected and in the next chapter I will show how and why Fukuyama believes 
biotechnology might attempt to threaten it 
                                                          




Chapter 3: Practical dangers of biotechnology in Fukuyama´s view 
 
One of the biggest threats that biotechnology may cause in the future is, according to 
Fukuyama, genetic enhancement of various human features that may be seen as less than 
optimal, as this may shake up the natural equality of human beings. This genetic 
enhancement, or as Habermas calls it “positive eugenics”, will most likely differ from the old, 
coercive, state-sponsored eugenics, such as the one exercised by the Nazi regime, in that the 
new eugenics will be rooted in democratic, capitalistic societies and will therefore be open as 
a possibility for individual use. Nevertheless, this ´new eugenics would permit in principle the 
conversion of all the unfit to the highest genetic level.´63 This may not seem that bad, 
especially when assuming, as Fukuyama does, that at some point in the future there will be a 
global consolidation of liberal democracy, and therefore no natural human qualities will be 
deemed as politically or economically deficient. However, this does not mean that some 
qualities will not be seen as better than others and with means to alter oneself or one´s 
offspring, it will be easy to erase those qualities with unexpected consequences for the 
society. Using the example with gay people again, it may be the case that even when 
homosexuality is totally accepted by the society, many people still ´may perceive gayness to 
be something akin to baldness or shortness—not morally blameworthy, but nonetheless a less-
than-optimal condition that, all other things being equal, one would rather have one’s children 
avoid.´64 This way of “optimizing” human nature may lead to reopening the discrimination of 
gay people, as their status would cease to be upheld by the notion that it is a natural and 
unchangeable human condition.  
 Habermas is equally concerned about manipulation with the human genome, an 
activity involving the “instrumentalization of human nature.” Like Fukuyama, Habermas 
suspects that various pragmatic, ideological or even fashion reasons due to which some 
people or groups of people may wish to alter themselves ´may give rise to a novel, curiously 
asymmetrical type of relationship between persons.´65 To Habermas the underlining reason to 
prohibit genetic enhancement is a philosophical one and has to do with a possible change in 
the general perception of human nature which could ´change our ethical self-understanding as 
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a species in a way that could also affect our moral consciousness.´66 At this point Habermas 
precisely articulates Fukuyama´s concerns. The perceived unity and moral equality of people 
rests on an idea of a common rootedness in nature which distributes nonessential human 
features randomly. The common denominator of all people is that they are created and 
determined by unpredictable nature. Habermas is doubtful about whether people can consider 
themselves peers deserving morally equal status once this common denominator is substituted 
by varying degrees of man-made genetic intervention. 
However, Habermas makes an important distinction between two forms of genetic 
interventions, one for therapeutic and other for enhancement purposes, and argues that it is 
only the latter that should be prohibited. Firstly, an intervention carried out for therapeutic 
purposes is justifiable ´as long as (it) is guided by the clinical goal of healing a disease or of 
making provisions for a healthy life.´67 The reason why therapeutic intervention solely for the 
purpose of maintaining health is, as opposed to genetic enhancement, morally justified, is 
because one can reasonably work with ´the presumption of informed consent´68 on the part of 
the patient, since according to Habermas (and Fukuyama) desire for health is species-typical 
to human beings. Habermas´ argument against genetic enhancement goes as follows. The 
patient´s (or an embryo´s) assumed consent is the morally crucial value in assessing the 
justifiability of any intervention, because individual autonomy is also one of the values 
intrinsic to human nature. However, genetic modification for enhancement purposes does not 
respect the moral category of consent or autonomy, and for this reason should be prohibited. 
When speaking about genetic enhancement, Habermas mostly considers pre-
implantation genetic diagnosis with the parents having the ability to shape and pre-determine 
particular features of the embryo. Habermas´ moral concern is that the parents here function 
as programmers, who effectively objectify their child by changing around its properties 
according to their liking, while ´there is no communicative scope for the projected child to be 
addressed as a second person and to be involved in a communication process.´69 The child is 
simply acted upon, while its autonomy is completely ignored. One may argue that such 
determination occurs also during the child´s life in the form of education. To this, Habermas 
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responds that education or any indoctrination during the person´s life nevertheless succeeds in 
´providing the addressee with an opportunity to take a revisionist stand´70 so that the person 
can consider these changes as a subject separate from him or herself, and potentially refine 
their impact. In other words, it is only modification occurring on a genetic level that can be 
considered as truly shaping human nature, but in a way which disregards the future person´s 
own preferences and substitutes them by preferences of the parents, current trends, fashion, 
etc. Fukuyama makes a similar point when he observes that ´parents may be under the sway 
of a contemporary fad or cultural bias or simple political correctness: one generation may 
prefer ultrathin girls, or pliable boys, or children with red hair—preferences that can easily 
fall out of favour in the next generation.´71   
Clearly, Fukuyama´s approach to this topic is more utilitarian than that of Habermas. 
Even though both operate with the notion of human nature, for Habermas it is a moral 
category which is worth respecting and preserving for its own sake, since respecting 
autonomy and natural human desires is simply the morally right thing to do, whereas for 
Fukuyama human nature in its current, “natural” state is rather a means of justifying and 
maintaining equality and peace in societies, hence well-being for the people. When Fukuyama 
talks about possible emergent inequality rooted in the open possibility of genetic 
modification, he tends to talk about it as a social issue. While Habermas would maintain that 
the issue is that people are being unfairly determined and objectified by other people, 
Fukuyama is more concerned with the unequal distribution of opportunities among the social 
classes to undergo (or have one´s offspring undergo) a genetic modification. He in a way 
surpasses Habermas in considering the detrimental consequences of genetic modification, in 
concluding that ´if wealthy parents suddenly have open to them the opportunity to increase 
the intelligence of their children as well as that of all their subsequent descendants, then we 
have the makings not just of a moral dilemma but of a full-scale class war.´72 Unequal human 
beings will emerge because some people will be able to afford genetic enhancement while 
others will not. While this may be considered secondary to the moral question of manipulation 
with someone´s most personal features without their admission, Fukuyama is more of a 
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sociologist on this matter in being concerned with how this may affect stability in existing 
democratic societies. 
Moreover, Fukuyama discerns a problem with Habermas´ distinction between therapy 
and enhancement, or rather lack thereof, which has further consequences. Fukuyama warns 
against what in his mind is an emerging medicalization of the society, which strengthens ´the 
tendency to expand the therapeutic realm to cover an ever larger number of conditions. It will 
always be possible to get a doctor somewhere to agree that someone’s unpleasant or 
distressing situation constitutes a pathology´73 For Fukuyama the often blurry line that exists 
between the concept of therapy and of enhancement constitutes a wider problem of 
biotechnology, whose dire consequences have been implied by the boom of 
neuropharmacology in the late twentieth century and the widespread prescription of drugs 
such as the antidepressant Prozac, a drug that elevates self-esteem, or the stimulant Ritalin, a 
drug that heightens concentration and in large dosages functions like cocaine. The 
documented use and abuse of these drugs demonstrate how shifty the definition of human 
pathology has become. Firstly, Fukuyama concedes that there are millions of people who are 
clinically depressed and to whom drugs like Prozac offer a genuinely needed help. However, 
the drug “helps” healthy people feel better, too, and since the demand for the drug has come 
from such a wide spectrum of the society, ranging from people with serious neurological 
disorders to perfectly healthy people, the line between when Prozac has therapeutic and when 
enhancement purposes has been truly blurred.   
 Fukuyama is concerned that the ominous pattern will continue into the age of 
biotechnology and genetic interventions. Namely, that there will be a satisfiable demand to 
disregard the natural distribution of various human qualities in favour of perfecting them to 
the maximum with considerable political repercussions. Let us take Ritalin as an example of 
how the idea of perfectibility results in strengthening social control through misunderstanding 
of human nature. Even though one can argue that control of behaviour via neurostimulators is 
not the same as genetic modification, Fukuyama is afraid that ´the politics of Ritalin (…) 
offers us a foretaste of what will come if and when genetic engineering, with its potentially far 
more powerful behavioural enhancements, becomes available.´ Ritalin is a drug that expands 
attention span and helps concentration. Since its inception it has been prescribed to young 
“hyperactive” boys who had problems focusing and sitting still in class. The diagnosis that the 
                                                          




drug was prescribed against was named ADD – Attention Deficit Disorder. However, as with 
Prozac, Ritalin helps anyone concentrate better, regardless of their level of hyperactivity and 
the line between pathology and simple restlessness becomes also blurred, as there is no limit 
to the desire for perfectibility even though there is no disorder to be fixed.  
Fukuyama writes: ´It is certainly the case that there are many people whose 
hyperactivity or inability to concentrate is so extreme that one would grant that biology is the 
primary determinant of their behaviour. But what about people who find themselves in, say, 
the fifteenth percentile of the normal distribution for attentiveness?´74 That is to say, the 
dangerous disregard for human nature lies in the idea that behavioural and later possibly 
genetic enhancement will interfere not with pathological disorders or deficiencies, but with 
perfectly natural scale of our species-typical distribution of qualities. The political dimension 
that this may translate into is that converging of masses via medical or genetic means to a 
singular mode of behaviour is a ready-made tool for social control, as it aligns motivations 
and makes distinctively different people uniform. One may recall the happiness-inducing drug 
soma from Brave New World or similarly oriented “treatments” from Ira Levin´s This Perfect 
Day (1970) to see how the blurred line between therapy and enhancement changes the 
perspective on what the function of human nature is. In This Perfect Day, for instance, only 
undergoing the monthly drug inducing treatments means that one is truly realizing one´s full 
human potential because they are avoiding socially undesirable elements such as misery, 
sadness, etc. 
Even democratic societies may experience this uniformity in collectively pursuing 
perpetual self-improvement, leading to eventual un-freedom and dysfunction of the society. 
The trend in genetic modification that Fukuyama foresees, and which was partly demonstrated 
by the politics of Prozac and Ritalin, is ´the desire on the part of ordinary people to medicalize 
as much of their behaviour as possible and thereby reduce their responsibility for their own 
actions (together with) the pressure of powerful economic interests to assist in this process.´75 
These interests exist because regardless of long-term detrimental effects, a genetic 
enhancement is nevertheless a more attractive shortcut to bringing about requested changes in 
behaviour or capabilities than complex behavioural interventions, training or education.  
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In conclusion to this point, if there is no clear line between therapy and enhancement, 
and Fukuyama argues that there often is not, then anyone can be susceptible to the prospect of 
immediate self-improvement, and philosophical discussions about the limits of therapy will be 
in the capitalistic societies superseded by economic pressures to follow the trend. The 
consequences may involve, as manipulation with Prozac and Ritalin show, social control, but 
not control that is state-based but one ´exercised by social players other than the state—by 
parents, teachers, school systems, and others with vested interests in how people behave.´76 
Fukuyama and Habermas agree that it would be wrong to manipulate behaviour, tendency for 
social compliance, intellect or other social or personal capabilities, because it would mean 
restricting people´s freedom of self-realization and self-determination.  
Another possible consequence, as has been mentioned, is class warfare due to an 
uneven economic access to these possibilities. This in a long-term perspective may result in 
drastically changing the nature of different groups of people. Consequently, it may be 
followed by the failure to recognize fellow human beings as members of the same morally 
worthy category, thereby failing to universally apply the species-ethic (Habermas´ terms) or 
species-typical distribution of ethical convictions, as Fukuyama would describe it, which 
otherwise adds to the stability and equality in democratic societies.  
Fukuyama´s approach to future uses of biotechnology such as genetic modification is 
that the state should take up the responsibility to impose harsh regulations on its practices and 
accessibility. The reason why he does not call for an outright ban is that he agrees with 
Habermas´ view that it should be allowed for treatments which are clearly therapeutic, such as 
´preimplantation diagnosis and screening (which) have begun to be used today to ensure the 
birth of children free of genetic diseases.´77 However, there is one practice which Fukuyama 
urges to be banned entirely, namely human cloning for reproductive purposes. There are 
several reasons for this claim. The first one is tactical. Since cloning is one of the few 
practices of genetic engineering that has already been successfully performed (though so far 
only on animals), it may be expected that it will be one of the first actual possibilities of 
biotechnology in the near future. However, according to Fukuyama, ´if we get used to cloning 
in the near future, it will be much harder to oppose germ-line engineering for enhancement 
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purposes in the future.78 In other words, unrestricted cloning would be a tactical stepping 
stone to further possibilities in genetic engineering such as the opportunity to design the 
character of one´s child or to undergo genetic self-enhancements. For this reason an outright 
ban seems necessary, despite it being possibly useful to further experiment with the 
manipulation with human genome, in order to ´establish the possibility of political control 
over biotechnology.´79 
Another argument bases its claim on the earlier discussion of human nature and refers 
to possible sociological consequences of using cloning for reproductive purposes. Echoing 
Habermas, Fukuyama states that ´a cloned child will have a very asymmetrical relationship 
with his or her parents.´80 From Fukuyama´s exposition of nature and its link to our sense of 
morality and belonging to the species or community it is clear that nature is a valid point of 
reference when discussing values and harmony in a society. Subsequently, some types of 
relationships and particularly family arrangements can be expected to be dysfunctional 
because they ignore intrinsic requirements of human nature. For this reason Fukuyama 
considers it meaningful to accuse the practice of reproductive cloning of being ´a highly 
unnatural form of reproduction that will establish equally unnatural relationships between 
parents and children.´81 The problem is that a cloned child would be an exact replica of one of 
the parents while having no genetic connection with another, which may become increasingly 
problematic as the child grows up to sexual maturity. Fukuyama´s concern is that the “foster” 
parent may have a problem raising the younger version of their spouse as their child and the 
unnaturalness of such disposition may cause disharmony inside family relationships and 
spread across the community, which may potentially turn against the clones themselves. 
If the issue of cloning is seen through the critical lenses of writers such as Fukuyama 
or Habermas, the primary reason for potential inability to integrate clones harmoniously into 
society is that they constitute a disruption in the fluidity of the evolutionary process, through 
which we have emerged as self-recognizing members of a singular species. Recognition of 
one another´s worth is a Hegelian concept which Fukuyama renders a cornerstone attribute of 
any functioning society. As he writes, ´ the historical process was fundamentally driven by the 
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struggle for recognition (…) ending in the emergence of modern democracy, in which all 
citizens were recognized as being free and worthy of equal recognition.´82 This is exactly 
what Habermas means when he speaks of our ´self-understanding as members of the 
species.´83 This mutual recognition is in fact an ontological one in the sense that human 
beings recognize one another´s ontological journey which had resulted in their existence 
(evolution, natural conception) as their own. In this respect human beings are fundamentally 
equal and Fukuyama would argue that a democratic state alone fully recognizes this 
ontological equality. However, it is reasonable to expect that clones will not enjoy the same 
level of mutual ontological recognition with other people. Since they will be manufactured 
rather than conceived, their ontological background will be vastly different and this difference 
will continue to inform their sense of self-identity, as the biological link between them and 
other people will be completely different from usual biological relations between people, such 
as between family members. For instance, a particular biological relation between a mother 
and a child is partly constitutive of the child´s self-identity and, as Harold W. Baillie and 
Timothy K. Casey write in the introduction to Is Human Nature Obsolete? (2005) ´to 
contravene this biological attachment of the fetus to its mother is to thwart the givenness of 
who and what we are.´84  
As Leon Kass has noted in his essay “The Wisdom of Repugnance” (1997), there is a 
moral issue with cloning in relation to the cloned subject, because cloning someone means 
giving the new subject an already predetermined genotype and as such depraving it of a 
´distinctive identity not only because he will be in genotype and appearance identical to 
another human being, but, in this case, because he may also be twin to the person who is his 
“father” or “mother”—if one can still call them that.´85 While the second part of the argument 
aligns with Fukuyama´s concerns, the first is reminiscent of Habermas´ assertion that it is 
immoral to allow the subject to be acted upon in such a drastic manner, since it involves an 
ignorance towards its autonomy. In a sense, the concept of the designer baby, meaning the 
ability to predetermine some qualities of one´s foetus, involves less coercion and disregard for 
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autonomy than cloning, because in the latter case the predetermination is total, as the foetus 
receives the exact same genotype to an already existing person. Kass even considers it 
´inherently despotic, for it seeks to make one’s children (…) after one’s own image (…) and 
their future according to one’s will.´86   
According to Fukuyama, the main argument of the book Our Posthuman Future is the 
conviction that there is a vital need ´to protect the full range of our complex, evolved natures 
against attempts at self-modification. We do not want to disrupt either the unity or the 
continuity of human nature, and thereby the human rights that are based on it.´87 The 
immediate question that arises is how and why biotechnology would threaten human 
complexity. According to Fukuyama it will be threatened both on an individual and a 
collective level, while in the latter case complexity is associated with demographic diversity 
of people in a society. On an individual level, as the analysis of the issue with 
neuropharmacology and drugs like Ritalin and Prozac showed, an excessive amount of 
people, including ones with close-to-normal distribution of relevant mental and emotional 
capacities, chose to disproportionately boost a capacity for happiness or alertness at the 
expense of natural proportion of human emotional and mental qualities. Fukuyama warns that 
there is no reason to doubt that this trend will translate into the era of genetic enhancements, 
whereby the human emotional gamut will become simplified and as such will be passed on 
from generation to generation genetically. The collective level is a second step of the process 
and the idea is that various human qualities will cease to be distributed evenly and “fairly” 
through natural processes of unpredictably passing on some genes more than others, and start 
to be distributed according to social and economic classes in the society, depending on who 
has the status, power or money to undergo a genetic enhancement. According to Fukuyama 
this process will inevitably lead to radical distinction between fractions of society not merely 
based on status and wealth but also according to physical and mental capacities, and may 
subsequently result in what he has called a “full-scale class warfare.” 
The reason for this trend is an anticipated utilitarian tendency within biotechnology to 
strive to modify just a few categories of human nature at the expense of an overall human 
complexity. These focused-on categories may include the capacity for pain and pleasure or 
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perhaps invite further interventions such as ´trying to make people less aggressive, more 
sociable, more compliant, less depressed.´88 According to Fukuyama, manipulation with 
human emotional and intellectual complexity is dangerous because the fine-tuning of the 
human moral sense, the successful result of which lent itself to the creation of constitutions of 
liberal democracies, is dependent on facing features of the entirety of the human emotional 
and intellectual gamut as they are distributed across the species. For this reason, for instance 
´the utilitarian goal of minimizing suffering is itself very problematic.´89 This is not because 
pain and suffering are desirable qualities in and on themselves but because human emotions 
and intellectual responses which inform moral sense are interrelated and develop mutually. 
For instance, many of human values and interpersonal relationships exist as a result of 
somehow dealing with pain and suffering. The underlining idea is that if genetic modification 
were an open opportunity, the status quo of natural and even distribution of both “good” and 
“bad” human traits would likely be overthrown by a utilitarian tendency of agents, ranging 
from institutions and their marketing strategies down to individual parents, to only focus on 
the selected few “good” ones. 
The above mentioned Fukuyama´s quotation, whose first part is analysed above, 
presents a concise summary of his two major issues with biotechnology. Both concern an 
unnatural change to human nature that is bound to create social and moral havoc. The first 
relates to the fear of a structural change of human nature. The ambition that may bring this 
change about is what Fukuyama has called ´the ultimate prize of modern genetic 
technology,´90 namely the ability to manipulate with the genetic code of unborn foetuses, 
thereby creating the so-called “designer babies,” whose human nature will have been 
purposely designed for them. The second major issue relates to the mentions of continuity and 
unity of human nature as necessary conditions for equal human rights and warns against an 
ontological change of human nature. The practice that best represents this concern is that of 
human cloning. Cloning raises issues of a collective human identity, or as Habermas calls it 
our self-understanding as members of a species. Harold W. Baillie and Timothy K. Casey also 
write in Is Human Nature Obsolete? about ´the potential impact of genetic engineering and 
cloning on our understanding of the human body, particularly the body’s role in the 
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constitution of self-identity.´91 I would add, not only self-identity but also, and for 
sociological reasons perhaps more importantly, identity ascribed by the society will be an 
issue for societies with a fraction of the population inhabited by clones, because of the 
ontological gap between the clones and the rest of the population. Unnatural and 
asymmetrical relations in the society may arise and as a result a somewhat futuristic form of 
racism against cloned individuals, based on a rationally defensible claim that the human 
species is no longer a unified whole because it lacks the major common denominator, namely 
naturalness in terms of conception, acquiring of a unique genome, kin relations and birth. In 
this sense a clone is farther from the natural constitution of human nature than the “designer 
baby” who may least share in the naturalness of conception and a unique, though largely 
manipulated with, genome.  
The particular dangers of biotechnology have therefore been filtered down to two 
major categories, one affecting the structure of human nature and the other affecting its 
natural ontology. The two trends in the anticipated biotechnological revolution that attract 
heated debates in the contemporary discourse and that best represent these two categories are 
pre-birth genetic modification representing the former, and human cloning representing the 
latter. 
There are therefore two essential claims or groups of claims that uphold Fukuyama´s 
theory in its entire complexity. One is that human nature is unique and special and necessary 
for continuation of a free society. The second is that genetic interference with the human 
species such as cloning will have a tendency to change the structure and complexity of the 
social discourse to detrimental effects. Human cloning in particular is seen to be capable of 
shaking the foundations of the natural connection between human nature and moral sense and 
will have equally damaging, if not worse, social effects, especially for the cloned individuals 
involved. Fukuyama´s conclusion therefore is a recommendation to heavily regulate arising 
biotechnologies, ´drawing red lines (…) within its range of possible uses to distinguish 
between what is legitimate and what is illegitimate,´92 such as distinguishing between therapy 
and enhancements wherever it is possible. 
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The next section of this thesis is dedicated to a further assessment of Fukuyama´s 
major claims that are fundamental to his attack of the culture of unregulated biotechnological 
possibilities. This assessment will take place through an analysis of two contemporary 
posthuman fictions, a novel and a trilogy of novels, each of which deals with one of these 
claims in detail and provide a surplus of further illustrations, evidence and arguments that 































Chapter 4: The future of human nature in Octavia Butler´s trilogy Lilith´s Brood 
 
 When analysing the novel Parable of the Talents (1998) by the science-fiction writer 
Octavia Butler, Tom Moylan writes about human communities leaving in spaceships for the 
stars, carrying ´an ecological and egalitarian promise into the galaxy, possibly preserving the 
only seeds of humanity that will outlast Armageddon on Earth.´93 While Butler´s writing often 
revolves around dilapidated conditions on Earth combined with an extra-terrestrial 
intervention, her trilogy Xenogenesis (1987-1989), later renamed as Lilith´s Brood, is in a 
sense a direct reversal of the above-mentioned description. Here it is not humanity that is apt 
to spread the ecological and egalitarian message to other places, it is from the outer space of 
the “other” that this promise has to come to inform and modify humanity. Also, it is not the 
pure seed of humanity that needs protection from external corruption, rather humanity is seen 
as a form of corruption and has to be enhanced into a specific form of posthumanity in an 
effort to prevent the feared Armageddon on Earth.    
Even though Butler, as Naomi Jacobs writes in “Posthuman Bodies and Agency in 
Octavia Butler’s Lilith´s Brood,” has claimed that her writing avoids ´all critical theory,´94 she 
did confess in a 1991 interview that the trilogy Lilith´s Brood actively reflects feminist ideals 
´in a sense that women do pretty much what they want to do,´95 instead of assuming an 
archetypal feminine role in any given situation. Despite the fact that in the same interview 
Butler largely denounced any labels on her works, her own take on the feminist discourse 
adds to a complex, thoroughly ambiguous trilogy that explores the struggle between two 
ideologically opposite approaches to the posthuman project: a conservative one that aligns 
with Fukuyama´s position, and a distinctive version of a transhumanist approach which 
welcomes not only change but perpetual change. Lilith´s Brood traces the evolution of the 
human into the posthuman with the use of a narrator who is increasingly more distinct from 
being human in each novel. In the process the novels attempt to define the contours of human 
nature and provide arguments both for its rigorous defense and for its abolishment, in search 
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for a perfect social and environmental harmony. As Jacobs writes, ´Butler proffers—and 
problematizes—two of the “utopian possibilities.”´96 Lilith´s Brood is thus a profoundly 
ambiguous trilogy, as it gives a certain amount of credibility to both sides and never really 
resolves the struggle between the desire to preserve or to overcome human nature.  
 The three novels that comprise the trilogy are called Dawn, Adulthood Rites and 
Imago. They are set in a post-apocalyptic future in which the human race has nearly wiped 
itself out through global nuclear warfare. The few who have survived have been taken by an 
intelligent alien life form, called the Oankali, into their spacecraft that orbits the desolated 
Earth. The Oankali are a race of beings that are both intellectually and technologically 
superior to humans and who seem to be at a comparatively further step in their very specific 
kind of an evolutionary process. They have a large number of body tentacles that amplify 
their senses; they can manipulate the human (and their own) genome at will, in order to heal 
wounds, prevent diseases or make improvements to the body. They also have three sexes, 
male, female and ooloi, the latter being a mediator between male and female, through whom 
mating and producing offspring is possible.  
On the spacecraft, each individual is kept in a single cell, regularly woken from an 
induced hibernation for interrogation and study. The reason why the Oankali rescued (or in a 
sense kidnapped) the human individuals is that, by nature, they constantly seek other life 
forms to perform a self-guided evolution by a so-called “gene trade” with other species. The 
gene trade is in fact a crucial activity for the existence of the Oankali species. In Dawn, an 
Oankali individual called Jdahya explains to Lilith: ´We are committed to the trade as your 
body is to breathing. We were overdue when we found you. Now it will be done – to the 
rebirth of your people and mine.´97 Both the Oankali and humans would merge geneticly and 
produce offspring that would be a different species from either of them altogether, thus 
enunciating the very definition of the term “xenogenesis.” 
 One of the captives is a human woman Lilith, who has been chosen by the Oankali to 
become a leader of a group of humans whom she is supposed to awake and train to become 
loyal to the Oankali and to accept peacefully their offer of a gene trade. The entire Dawn is 
written from her perspective and follows her as she learns about the Oankali and struggles 
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with the idea of merging with the alien species, as it would effectively mean the end of the 
human race. Dawn leads the reader to sympathize with Lilith´s sentiment and her sense of 
resistance, for several reasons. Firstly, from the outset the narration establishes an uneven  
power relation between the humans and the Oankali. Lilith first loses her spatial freedom, as 
she is held captive in a closed environment. Then, when she is let out among the Oankali, she 
discovers her role and future had been predetermined for her, and struggles to come to terms 
with losing her individual agency. Then, since the Oankali can, and are going to, manipulate 
Lilith´s genetic code, she also fears losing her identity. Lastly, to some extent she shares the 
conviction of other, more impulsive humans, that giving in to the aliens and allowing them to 
radically transform the human race would be a fatal blow to human dignity. 
 Even though the Oankali are essentially nonviolent, they do not give Lilith or the other 
woken humans any real freedom to choose to do what they want with their lives. Either they 
submit to the plan laid out for them or they will remain to be captive on the ship until they die. 
Despite Oankali peacefulness, the narrative is initially structured as a classical dystopia, in 
which ´we encounter an oppressive, nearly omnipotent, ubiquitous power from the 
perspective of a resistant consciousness.´98 The Oankali, though uninvited, cross all kinds of 
boundaries: personal, sexual, physical, even genetic. They have prohibited people to 
reproduce freely. Some people are sterilized while others are impregnated without their 
consent, like Lilith with Joseph´s sperm. All these transgressions reduce humans to beings 
without agency and increasingly without identity, and this ostensible form of oppression 
aligns with the aim of many classical dystopias in which the distribution of power is similarly 
uneven.    
 This initial disposition thus clearly suggests which side of this opposition holds the 
ethical high ground that the reader should sympathize with. Even though humans would have 
eradicated their own species in nuclear warfare, they are nevertheless imprisoned, enslaved, 
transgressed and devoid of agency. However, at this point Butler problematizes the entire 
quest to regain people´s humanity by casting doubt on what human nature actually entails. In 
a sense this can be seen as an attack on Fukuyama´s essential contentions of the uniqueness 
and goodness of human nature. Lilith´s Brood demonstrates an anthropological bias in the 
perception of naturally evolved intelligence, sexuality, kin relations and social structures by 
                                                          




dislocating the human from their centre, the assumed point of their most complete 
convergence. Suddenly the social structures, “symmetrical” sexual and kin relations of the 
human race are made to look faulty and erroneous, compared to the non-hierarchical, almost 
completely pacifistic and seemingly flawless Oankali. 
The main issue with human nature that Butler expresses, and which the Oankali use to 
justify their taking over of the human race, is that human nature contains a fatal inner flaw, 
which the Oankali call the Human Contradiction. According to Akin, Lilith´s human-Oankali 
son and the main character of Adulthood Rites, the contradiction consisted of the coexistence 
of ´intelligence and hierarchical behavior. It was fascinating, seductive, and lethal. It had 
brought Humans to their final war.´99 Obviously, the world of Lilith´s Brood is one in which 
the threat of a devastating nuclear war had already taken place and it seems that through the 
Oankali, Butler seems to suggest that it is an inherent human tendency to eventually come to 
the point of self-destruction. It seems that precisely the Hegelian quality that Fukuyama 
deems invaluable in humans, communities and nations, namely the need for mutual 
recognition as a sovereign agent, is in Oankali´s anthropogenic philosophy the human´s 
naturally self-defeating factor. 
The behaviour of most humans in Lilith´s Brood further confirms this “genetic flaw” 
that humans carry in them. As Jacobs writes, ´throughout the trilogy, those human beings who 
hold most tightly to their human identities are also the ones who exhibit the worst elements of 
humanity.´100 Indeed, most humans on the ship, once they have learnt of their situation, either 
use their intelligence to calculate and plot against the Oankali and Lilith, whom they see as a 
traitor to the human race, or they exhibit frequent inclinations to violence, rape and murder as 
a response to the confusion of their predicament. In Adulthood Rites most people had been 
brought down to Earth where they can choose either to live in villages with the Oankali and 
have “construct” children with them, or they can settle in separate villages, but sterilized. In 
this situation the behaviour of the humans continues to be irrational, erratic, self-destructive 
and violent. Men of the so-called Resister villages raid other villages, rape and enslave 
women and even sometimes attack the Oankali, although they know they can barely hurt 
them, instead almost certainly inflicting enormous damage to themselves. 
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Although the Human Contradiction, as understood by the Oankali, consists of a fatal 
combination of hierarchy and intelligence, from the behaviour of humans aboard the ship and 
later in the villages it seems that rather than juxtaposing these two terms, they cancel each 
other out. The humans commit the most irrational acts in situations where the hierarchy that 
they were used to is missing or is substituted by another. In Dawn, most people, especially 
men, react with irrational reluctance to accept that Lilith, who is a black woman, has been 
chosen as their leader. Lilith constantly feels that the group is plotting against her. They 
become passive and later active aggressive towards Lilith and one man even tries to rape her. 
The humans also seem to have a hard time adjusting to no imposed hierarchy at all. Once they 
are freed back on Earth and left to build their own villages, various groups of humans go 
rampant, regularly terrorizing the humans and the Oankali in the vicinity.  
In Jacobs´ reading of Lilith´s Brood, the main difference of the trilogy from classical 
dystopias is that the moral imbalance comes ultimately down not to an alien superpower that 
threatens the purity of humanity but rather to humanity itself, which in an absence of 
regulations and established social norms behaves in the most barbaric ways. Almost all that 
the humans do only further confirms the Oankali conviction that ´if human beings do not 
evolve toward posthumanity, their innate aggressiveness will destroy them.´101 
It therefore seems that Butler takes a similar view on human nature to Thomas 
Hobbes. Namely, that without authoritarian order the agency of people will manifest in 
violent behaviour of groups in striving to overthrow one hierarchical system over another. 
Even worse, in complete anarchy a perpetual state of violence between individuals would 
exist in pursuit of power, food, materials, etc. As Hobbes famously wrote in his tract “De 
Cive - Philosophical Rudiments Concerning Government and Society” (1642), ´the state of 
men without civil society, which state we may properly call the state of nature, is nothing else 
but a mere war of all against all.´102 In contrast, on this subject Fukuyama holds a view similar 
to John Locke (even though he disagrees on the matter of innate ideas) that humans naturally 
converge on essential values and therefore cooperate and compromise rather than fight, and 
naturally seek to establish a benevolent social and political order.  
                                                          
101 Jacobs 101. 





However, Lilith´s Brood exposes humans for having an innate tendency of thinking 
and behaving in exclusionary terms, which have reflected in the political orders that 
eventually led to the final disaster. Unlike the Oankali, humans constantly think in terms of 
in-group and out-group members, and allocate one another into concentric circles according to 
the measure of difference that the other represents. Judging by the way the humans behave in 
Lilith´s Brood towards Lilith, each other and the Oankali themselves, one can argue that while 
the most immediate concentric circles of “otherness” are inhabited by different race, gender or 
sexual orientation and cause a various degree of obstruction in successful social cohesion, 
some of the furthest spaces of “otherness” and therefore complete unacceptability are 
represented by beings of a different species. It is therefore no surprise that ´Butler vividly 
evokes the visceral terror the humans initially experience upon seeing the Oankali.´103 To the 
humans, the Oankali represent a complete subversion of humanity, a prototypical out-group 
community, and for this reason they are deeply reluctant to cooperate with them. 
The reluctance to join the Oankali in their quest for posthumanism is therefore caused 
by the natural human flaw of “othering” various groups of individuals merely for being 
different, while dogmatically clinging to their own notion of humanity. However, it is not 
only the Oankali themselves but especially their proposed project of merging with the human 
species that humans find completely unacceptable, since for them ´even when more 
accustomed to the physical appearance of the aliens, they find the thought of having children 
who “won’t be human” deeply repellent.´104  This position can be read as a hyperbole of 
Fukuyama´s own clinging to the notion of humanity without fully understanding how 
posthumanism may alter it for the better.    
However, Lilith´s Brood does not unequivocally condemn human nature in favour of 
posthumanity. In fact, all three main characters of the novels, Lilith, Akin and Jodahs 
respectively, represent an ambiguous position towards the project of merging humans with the 
Oankali and of human nature becoming a mutable, relational entity. While Lilith is 
increasingly content with the Oankali prevailing over the human will for absolute freedom, 
she has arguably been forced into a position where most humans around her do not identify 
her as an ally and she thus has no other choice but to side with the Oankali. As Restituta 
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Castiello writes in an article “Xenogenesis: Lilith The “Other” And The Alien Origin Story in 
the Science Fiction Saga of Octavia Estelle Butler” (2010), Lilith ´proves to be more a 
boycotter than a collaborator.´105 Her desire to retain a degree of self-autonomy of the humans 
is abundantly present throughout Dawn and gives the humans choosing the status quo a sense 
of justifiability. Moreover, in Castiello´s reading of Lilith´s Brood, Lilith´s character by nature 
represents “the other” not only in relation to humans but to the Oankali as well. Lilith fails to 
meet any expectations that are asked of her. She is no ultimate saviour nor traitor to the 
humans, therefore she cannot be idealized and thus categorized as a “goddess” or a “demon” 
towards her own species. She also escapes the established category of the “mother” since the 
Oankali have redefined and dislocated this notion from the centre of procreation (every 
construct child has five parents altogether). In relation to the Oankali, also, she falls short of 
all expectations. She is not a complete collaborator but neither is she a resister. She cooperates 
but at the same time struggles for the rights of the humans for freedom. Lastly, her species-
identity has also shifted away from any recognizable category. She is not Oankali nor a 
construct but she has also in a sense ceased to be just a human, due to the alterations and 
enhancements that the Oankali performed upon her. Lilith´s identity therefore meets the very 
notion “otherness,” which arguably gives her the ultimate perspective on any power structure 
she encounters. In Castiello´s words, ´by virtue of her being so defying and displacing, she 
represents the “otherness” (…) able to disclose the power of oppressive discourses wherever 
they are.´106  
  Lilith´s children Akin and Jodahs, who are the focalizers of the second and third 
volumes respectively, further emphasize the idea that Lilith represents both by her 
intersectional identity and her actions. Throughout their lives, Akin and Jodahs are both 
deeply engaged in making an appeal to the Oankali in favour of the human autonomy and 
self-preservation as a species. Akin, the protagonist of Adulthood Rites, is a construct male 
whose both physical and cognitive features are a combination of the human and the Oankali. 
Perhaps due to his mother´s legacy of carving a pathway between the two species, he 
continues the peace-making process, whose long-term goal is to win the right for selected 
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human individuals to start a settlement on Mars. While Akin realizes the fact of the human 
contradiction, as he has witnessed human barbarity, brutality and violence since his infancy, 
he retains his emotional capacity for empathy and compassion towards human suffering. 
While the Oankali themselves attribute no legitimacy to the idea of preserving human nature 
solely for its own sake, Akin, perhaps because he is partly human himself and thus knows 
what it is to have human nature, fights for the right of the humans not to have to give it up. In 
Jacobs´ reading, it is Akin´s intersectional nature that enables him to empathize fully with 
both species without seeing either one as the “other.” Citing Diana Meyers, Jacob claims that 
Akin´s posthuman nature entails ´tensions between the different dimensions of intersectional 
identity (which) introduce a wedge of optionality that authorizes individual reflection and 
choice.´107 In other words, Akin´s multiple identities, a heritage of the Oankali trades, allow 
him to dismiss the notion of centrality of any one identity, an achievement apparently 
unattainable to the humans, while being able to fully appreciate the uniqueness of both forms 
of agency from within, as these share in equally on the creation of his posthuman self. Akin 
therefore sees human nature as unique and worth preserving, but it is paradoxically his 
posthuman nature that allows him to appreciate it. Therefore, more than to the worthiness of 
humanity, the story of Adulthood Rites attests to the possible cognitive and emotional 
superiority of posthumanity. 
The third volume, Imago, is, in contrast, the most critical one in its illustration of the 
possibilities and limitations of the posthuman project. It demonstrates how an extreme form of 
relational and intersectional nature of identity may endanger the very notion of the self. The 
protagonist of Imago is Akin´s sibling Jodahs, who is also a human-Oankali construct, but the 
first one to develop into an ooloi. As such, Jodahs, as well as his other sibling Aor, who also 
becomes a construct ooloi, represents the furthest step in the posthuman evolution explored in 
the Lilith´s Brood trilogy. Jodahs´ human part of his identity is almost unrecognizable, not 
because the Oankali part overpowers it but rather because he almost completely lacks any 
species-specific nature apart from that of constant change; his identity, sexuality, appearance 
as well as his very genetic code are due to his fluid subjectivity constantly transforming. 
Jodahs´ nature is extremely relational; he takes partial shape of almost everything he touches 
with his sensory tentacles and can only retain his self after having found human individuals 
                                                          




with whom he can mate. Even worse off is his sibling Aor, to whom the planned migration of 
many humans to Mars causes his inability to find human mates. Aor´s mutability de facto 
makes loneliness and isolation a lethal enemy, for it leads to almost a complete dissolution of 
his self, which can only be reconstituted relationally. The weakness of Butler´s idea of 
posthumanity is therefore exposed as being the other side of the coin from its biggest triumph. 
Posthumanity, which supersedes the human confinement in egocentrism, entails considerable 
powers, but ´the price of its powers (…) is interdependence, to the point that an ooloi will die 
if one of its mates dies.´108 Indeed, it appears that after the metamorphosis into an ooloi Aor 
enters a lengthy but discontinuous kind of slumber, too long even for the Oankali, which may 
be interpreted as a deep state of depression from slowly losing the coherent version of one´s 
self. Even though the novel ends in a somewhat more upbeat tone (some humans agree to 
mate with the oolois), it appears that the sense of a coherent identity, integrity and the self are 
notions that Butler considers more than just biased, anthropomorphic projections, but rather 
necessary conditions to the preservation of intelligent life. 
 Butler´s ambiguous position on when the contribution of posthumanity switches from 
being productive to counter-productive informs the entire trilogy and is perhaps the message 
that ought to be considered when analysing some much more one-sided approaches to the 
subject such as transhumanism on the one hand or the Fukuyama´s on the other. As Jacobs 
writes, ´Butler’s trilogy conveys both the beauty and the horror of a future in which the self-
determining humanist self has dissolved and the human body as we know it will have changed 
or even disappeared.´109 It is the fear of completely losing individuality and agency that has 
given a degree of balance to the trilogy in which otherwise the Oankali always seem to be 
intellectually impeccable. However, Butler seems to distinguish between different motivations 
to preserve human nature. While the fear which stems from a reluctance to part with the 
historical reality of social and cultural hierarchy may be dogmatic (embracing human nature 
merely because this is what we have always been), there is a deeper worry that transforming 
into the posthuman may entail a dangerous dissolution of the subject, due to the lack of 
individuality, agency and self-autonomy. Butler seems to give this second reason for 
carefulness some justification.  
                                                          
108 Jacobs 107. 




 The initial point of divergence between Lilith´s Brood and classical dystopias is the 
moment Butler exposes human weakness in desperately clinging to their destructive and 
barbaric tendencies. At this point Fukuyama would probably take issue with Butler´s 
presentation of barbarism and violence as standard human behaviour. Fukuyama´s line of 
argument, as has been mentioned earlier, is that it is an intellectual as well as emotional 
achievement of human nature to realize that while everybody is different, there is an 
underlining quality, namely belonging to the same species, which should secure intra-species 
equality. However, as various human-Oankali constructs show, this argument unnecessarily 
draws the line at humanity. The essential difference on this matter between Fukuyama and 
Butler is that while for the former human nature sets everyone apart (everybody is different) 
and then unites them back along artificially created lines, for the latter the assurance of 
equality lies in an absence of stable nature, substituted by constant transformation and 
evolution. The notion of human nature as a safeguard for equality is in Fukuyama´s theory 
rigid, unchanging and therefore exclusionary. The Oankali anthropogenic philosophy runs 
deeply against Fukuyama´s humanist model in the sense that it is inclusionary rather than 
exclusionary. It grants inclusion to new subjects that are yet to emerge and therefore the line 
which Fukuyama holds steadfast at the current notion of human nature, shifts naturally with 
this continuous inclusion (of subjects such as the human-Oankali constructs, human ooloi, 
etc.) into the definition of what is human and thus worth protecting.   
 Human nature as perceived by Fukuyama therefore constantly defines and stands in 
opposition to some kind of an “other.” However, the posthuman subjectivity that Butler 
envisions erodes this concept because the nature of Butler´s posthumanism is difference and 
transformation, which means that all subjects are on equal grounds in that they are constantly 
changing. This move to posthumanism can also be seen as a way of liberation of constructions 
that are attached to human nature such as the binary oppositions between male and female, 
mind and body, self and other, etc. As can be seen throughout Lilith´s Brood, these 
oppositions entail social hierarchies that the Oankali scorn and which are detrimental to the 
functioning of the human species due to the constant involvement of violence and assertion of 
power structures. In fact, Butler seems to welcome a posthuman future which does away with 
these ´humanist assumptions,´110 and which breaks down the anthropomorphic perception of 
values, intelligence and agency.   
                                                          




 In proposing fluidity and inclusiveness as inherent to posthuman subjectivity, rather 
than accepting the humanist project of asserting a firm definition of the human, Butler 
becomes fully engaged with the feminist discourse, whose many theorists ´have also 
presented the multiplicity of the posthuman subject as a source of political resistance (which) 
can bring an epistemological advantage to members of disadvantaged groups.´111 The hybrid, 
intersectional subjectivity of the human-Oankali construct such as Lilith´s son Akin is 
inherently incapable of discriminating or othering based on difference, because difference and 
fluid transgression are the cornerstones of Akin´s nature. Similarly, the feminist author and 
activist Gloria E. Anzaldúa imagines a somewhat utopian “new consciousness.” Instead of 
rigidity of human nature Anzaldúa imagines a being called “a new mestiza,” which is a result 
of ´racial, ideological, cultural and biological crosspollinization.´112 In the new mestiza there 
is a ´confluence of two or more genetic streams, with chromosomes constantly “crossing 
over,”´113 just like the genetic information literally crosses over one Oankali body to another. 
Anzaldúa´s project is largely informed by an effort to eliminate discrimination as a result of 
difference, which is how Butler portrays the Oankali´s goal as well.  
Other feminist writers understand the posthuman subject along similar lines. Donna 
Haraway´s cyborg, for instance, has been heralded to be ´embodying the liberatory potential 
of the posthuman subject and body.´114 Apart from undermining socially established binary 
oppositions related to the notion of the human, Haraway uses the concept of the cyborg to 
espouse her alternative interpretation of history, namely origin stories that are a part of our 
culture, tradition, etc. Haraway claims that ´we have all been colonized by those origin 
myths,´115 whose danger lies in perpetuating stereotypical understanding of hierarchy and 
power and as such are oppressive tools for ´command and control´116 of various groups of 
marginalized people. Cyborgs, however, subvert these Western origin stories, by, as Cathy 
Peppers writes in an article “Dialogic Origins and Alien Identities in Butler’s Lilith´s Brood” 
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(1995) ´creating an other human identity by “seizing the tools to mark the world that has 
marked” everyone except white men “as other”; and it’s also a story of our origins as 
cyborgs.´117 Haraway herself claims that ´we are cyborgs. The cyborg is our ontology,´118 
where cyborg is seen as breaking the boundaries not just between the human and the machine 
but also between human and animal, where animal can be understood as all that is non-
human. In this sense, according to Peppers, Lilith´s Brood is really a cyborg origin story as 
well as an origin story of posthuman bodies as cyborgs. It is a cyborg origin story in the sense 
that it subverts, rather than empowers, hierarchical roots; once humans have merged with the 
Oankali, established hierarchical social and biological structures break down and with them 
not only the rigidity of human nature but also the entire Western ´tradition of racist, male-
dominant capitalism.´119 
The story of Lilith´s Brood has not only ´wiped the cultural slate clean in order to 
retell the story of human evolution,´120 but it has also set a pattern of how human beings ought 
to define their nature in the future. Posthumanism may not necessarily be a technological or 
genetic advancement of the human body but also an evolution in understanding human nature 
itself. Butler and other feminist writers seem to suggest that if human history is a history of 
hierarchy and oppression, posthumanism is an intellectual stage at which we will begin to see 
human nature as nomadic, integrating difference and fluidity in identity rather than excluding 
on the basis of difference. As Rosi Braidotti, a feminist writer and philosopher, suggests, 
human nature should be rethought as being intrinsically resistant to being captured as a 
definitive concept in that it involves, according to Braidotti, ´an acute awareness of the 
nonfixity of boundaries´121 and also ´the intense desire to go on trespassing, transgressing.´122   
In much feminist theory, the constant creation of the “other” is a form of maintaining 
hierarchical power relations between groups of people. In this sense the differentiations and 
ostensible oppositions within human nature, such as different gender or race, which 
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Fukuyama defends and celebrates as a part of human complexity, is a societal tool of control. 
Fukuyama would argue that while difference is real, due to the universal possession of human 
nature (the Factor X) it would be illegitimate to exploit any of the secondary human 
characteristics for power-related purposes. However, Butler shows a world in which 
Huntington´s idea of a large-scale clash of values and perpetual “othering” of other cultures 
leads to self-destruction before a major improvement in social conditions can be achieved. 
Moreover, even the ideal notion of a democratic society cannot prevent discrimination based 
on difference, on a social or political level. This is the result of power being understood as ´a 
monolithic structure (rather than) a constantly shifting interplay of forces and tendencies.´123 
Butler, instead, proposes erasure of power structures in forming a new, posthuman concept of 
the self, one that is truly related to others and to the world, constantly changing and evolving 
interdependently, as only then ´spaces can open up for resistance, spontaneity, self-
creation.´124  
The posthuman future that Butler envisions thus contains aspects of ecological utopia 
where people coexist with the environment on a symbiotic basis. Instead of exploiting it for 
expansion and technological advancement, people and environment function relationally as 
one living organism, erasing firm physical as well as hierarchical boundaries, just like the 
Haraway´s cyborg. In fact, symbiosis is the nature of the Oankali and increasingly more of the 
humans who engage with them. Moreover, the Oankali break down the boundaries between 
environment and technology, for there is no artificiality in anything they operate with. All 
houses, the spaceship, even the village Lo that they establish on Earth are living organisms 
that they can communicate with and with which they “trade”. As such, instead of merging 
with the machine, as Haraway writes, Butler suggests replacing the machine altogether as a 
part of the posthuman condition. 
 In conclusion, Lilith´s Brood is a critical dystopia that reflects and criticizes harmful 
tendencies of the contemporary interactions between humans on both individual and social 
level. The trilogy also contains traces of ecological utopia represented by works such as 
Ernest Callenbach´s Ecotopia (1975), combined with distinctive forms of transhumanism, 
advocated by a number of feminist writers, which aim to reform human nature or at least 
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modify our perception of it. While refraining from an unequivocal condemnation of human 
nature, it is clear that Butler alleges it to be historically structured to emphasize difference 
over inclusion and power over reason. Butler shows the effort of the human resisters in 
Lilith´s Brood to maintain identity, autonomy and agency as almost as biased as though they 
were a matter of nationalistic pride. The trilogy rather sympathizes with human individuals 
who have come to reasonably conclude that integration with the Oankali is not only inevitable 
but also justified and who therefore accept the transhumanist view that human nature is a 
process or a development rather than a rigid concept.  
Fukuyama and his adversaries in the feminist and transhumanist discourse agree that 
certain aspects of the society have to change in order to achieve prosperity and equality.  
However, for Fukuyama the issues of oppressive power relations are aspects of a wrongly 
structured society, not of human nature, which has been almost to this day restricted from 
fully formulating its social and political potential. The more fundamental disagreement, 
however, lies in the distribution of moral status. While Fukuyama celebrates difference and 
only requires an essential commonality, the strand of feminist discourse described above 
cannot accept that, not only because it is anti-essentialist, but also because difference is 
exclusionary and thus constitutes the power relations in the first place. This line of reasoning 
follows Foucault for whom the desire for individuality and identity is simultaneously a result 
and a perpetuator of the game for power. As he writes in an essay “Space, Knowledge and 
Power,” ´the individual, with his identity and characteristics, is the product of a relation of 
power exercised over bodies, multiplicities.125 The story of Lilith´s Brood, however, does not 
unequivocally promote embracing difference over individuality, instead it remains an 
ambiguous text that gives some, though unequal, credit to both sides of the argument. As such 
it manages not to be an ideological text, further shedding critical light on Fukuyama and 
others who firmly hold a singular position on a complex issue such as posthumanism. 
Nevertheless, Butler´s trilogy helps pave the intellectual way into the multicultural space in 
which it is reasonable to ´set aside (…) fears of difference and of change´126 and try to live 
more cohesively with each other and the environment. Posthumanism may in this sense mean 
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a cultural and social evolution in human practices rather than a biotechnologically based 


































Chapter 5: The value of posthuman life in Kazuo Ishiguro´s Never Let Me Go 
 
 Fukuyama´s main effort in Our Posthuman Future is to warn against the way 
biotechnological advancement may lead to a future of large-scale discrimination between 
groups of people with different, artificially predetermined human natures. However, as the 
previous chapter has shown, his idea of human nature has come under attack by theorists who 
disagree with its definitional rigidity and a latent hostility to difference, and who argue that 
his moral reasoning which renders a specific type of human nature as the locus of moral 
weight perpetuates tendencies for discrimination and stratification instead of extinguishing 
them. When the focus shifts from the theoretical debate about the constituents of human 
nature to the specific moral analysis of a posthuman society, the problematic nature of 
Fukuyama´s (and Habermas´) position becomes even more visible. In order to elucidate it, 
this chapter will analyse the 2005 novel Never Let Me Go, written by Kazuo Ishiguro, a text 
that serves a dialogic function in the posthumanist discourse in that it counterbalances the 
position of the theorists with the voice of the posthuman subjects themselves.   
Never Let Me Go has been described as representing ´intersections of ethics and 
biopolitics´127 and indeed the novel foregrounds the ethical side of handling a posthuman life 
more than an economic or political one. Instead of a large-scale debate about the challenges 
that the human species may come to face, thematically dominating in novels such as the 
trilogy Lilith´s Brood, Ishiguro´s novel is a very intimate first-person account of a posthuman 
subjectivity which is consumed in the seeming every day mundanity. The story of the novel 
revolves around a group of human clones living in an alternative 20th century England, who 
are, by unspecified social and political mechanisms, bred and brought up with the single 
purpose to become donors of their vital organs around the time they reach their late twenties. 
The narration consists of a number of temporally layered reminiscences by a clone named 
Kathy H., who has been, along with her closest friends Tommy and Ruth, brought up and 
educated in an isolated boarding school called Hailsham, ostensibly treated just like regular 
children, but continuously conditioned to accept the fact that not before long they will become 
“donors” and eventually “complete” (a euphemism for dying).  
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In Never Let Me Go, Ishiguro deliberately omits any mention of governmental control 
oppression that would overtly restrict the clones´ freedom, in order to show how completely 
the social conditioning has determined the status of the clones as secondary citizens. This is 
also why the novel frequently has a defeatist tone, as none of the clones ever contemplate 
organized resistance nor escape, as one would expect in traditional dystopias, no less in a very 
similar posthuman story about the exploitation of clones in the 2005 film The Island, directed 
by Michael Bay. The clones of the film are also bred in an isolated place, fed (more overt) lies 
about their lives and eventually taken one by one to be killed for organs. However, while the 
action-packed Hollywood film centres on the traditional dystopian counter-narrative revolving 
around rebellion and escape, Never Let Me Go is about the way the notion of humanity may 
blur one´s moral compass in the territory of posthumanism. In one of the most important 
passages of the novel, Miss Emily, a former teacher of Kathy, explains why they used to 
collect the clones´ art over the years in the boarding school. She explains that at first, all 
clones ´existed only to supply medical science,´128 because the society determined that clones 
bore barely any ethical importance. By exposing the clones´ art in various galleries, some 
activists tried to make clear to the public at large that the treatment of clones was immoral 
because the clones possessed a fully developed human nature. ´”There, look!” we could say. 
“Look at this art! How dare you claim that these children are anything less than fully 
human?´129 During the course of the novel, however, it becomes clear that this effort has also 
failed to save the clones from the donations and it only secured a better treatment of them 
during their childhoods. 
The dominant group of the society, the humans, therefore fail to ascribe equal moral 
status to the clones because they do not fit the criteria of what it is to be a standard human. As 
a result, a subversion of a social space opens up for the clones, a space that resembles Judith 
Butler´s term ´a domain of abjection.´130 In her theory, due to the hierarchical nature of the 
social and political power structure, groups of people whose identification does not align with 
the preferred standard of the general discourse (current examples may include homosexuals, 
transgender individuals, etc.), are pushed away from the dynamic levels of social existence 
and become the “abject bodies”: a category of people who are unequivocally unaccepted, 
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feared and ultimately repudiated. In the case of Never Let Me Go, the bodies of the clones are 
not only unaccepted, due to their “inhumanity” they cease to be subjects and become a mere 
set of signifiers: a signifier of body parts, of a biotechnological function, of health and 
rejuvenation for humans. Far more than the humans subjected to the will of the Oankali, the 
clones of Never Let Me Go are stripped of their subjectivity and agency by not meeting the 
established understanding of humanity. 
 In Carmen-Veronica Borbély´s reading of Ishiguro´s novel and the subsequent film 
adaptation, elaborated on in the essay “Body Drift: On the Precariousness of Posthuman Life 
in Never Let Me Go,” since the turn of the last century marked by an accelerated 
technologization and digitalization of both social and scientific discourse, the notions of the 
body, corporeality and individuality have been dislocated, obscured and inevitably undergone 
a shift in meaning. With the emerging biotechnological discourse of genetic manipulation 
with the human body, this dislocation of previously established meanings will be further 
reaffirmed. As such, we can no longer project a singular structure of a body in either social or 
scientific terms, because ´with the aid of the new technologies, the multifarious codes of 
health, gender, class, age or ethnicity are scrambled up, remixed, respliced and redesigned, 
(and) are reconstructing the human as a posthuman body.´131 Borbély thus suggests that in this 
posthuman age our understanding of the body is best described by the concept of “body drift,” 
a term originally coined by a cyberculture theorist Arthur Kroker in his eponymous 2012 
book. The term essentially means that the body can no longer be perceived as a singular 
whole, because it has largely disintegrated into codes that various discourses, such as the 
technological, digital or biotechnological one, piece together differently, thus creating a 
society of multiplicity of bodies which differ from each other both ontologically and 
teleologically.     
Borbély argues that the hierarchical structure of the posthuman body politics in Never 
Let Me Go has enabled a certain combination of codes constitute the normative corporeality 
and humanity while pushing the posthuman element out of the sphere of social acceptance. 
The clones are by the law and the society at large perceived in strictly functional, pragmatic 
terms, thus foregrounding codes that are unified by a utilitarian project. Ignoring their own, 
posthuman subjectivity, the clones´ corporeality is broken down into commodificatory and 
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quantifiable signifiers such as provider of health, cure or tool for restoration of life, while 
their bodies are literally broken down into particular organs. The otherness of the clones 
which has brought about this perception of a radical ontological difference is close to taking 
the form of the Uncanny valley, when the clones discuss their “possibles.” According to 
Borbély the clones ´simultaneously define and encroach the boundaries of normative 
humanity,´132 a relation that takes a literal undertone in relation to the clones´ possibles, since 
they are both like them and radically unlike them. The clones are at the same time a reminder 
of genuine human nature and an affirmation of this nature´s assumed absence. As such ´they 
both reinforce and invalidate notions of individual autonomous selfhood, conceived, within 
the Western paradigm, as located within the separate, distinct, and impermeable contours of 
normatively embodied individuals,´133 whom the clones serve as a mere reminder of. 
Borbély looks for a way to efface the perceived otherness of the clones, which has 
effectively rendered them a property of the society, and instead to find a basis for upholding 
their dignity as posthuman subjects. She finds it in the very structure of Ishiguro´s novel, 
which functions as a reconstruction of a clone´s identity as an individual with fully developed 
intellectual and emotional gamut, a complexity which Fukuyama would call Factor X. It is the 
complexity of Kathy´s highly intimate multiplicity of narrations, recollections and layers of 
internal monologue that successfully reconstitutes all the separate codes that the society 
identified her with into a coherent whole. It is ´by narrating herself into existence, by 
compassionately embracing the other and by cultivating memory as the bulwark of 
identitarian singularity,´134 that Kathy is proving herself to be a complete rather than deficient 
individual, a task that the efforts of Madame´s organization failed to accomplish.  
The element that underlines the bleakness of an otherwise calm and collected narrative 
is the frequent theme of absence. There is an absence of resistance or a will to escape on the 
part of the clones; there is an absence of a visible coercive force, present in most dystopias, 
that would keep the clones in line; and in Kathy´s life there are absences that take form of 
anticlimactic events, which illustrate the impenetrability and almost incomprehensibility of 
the faceless establishment that has been systematically oppressing the clones. The 
anticlimactic events of Kathy´s life include the search for the Ruth´s ”possible” which proved 
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to be in vain, or seeking with Tommy to get a “deferral,” a delay in their duty to become 
donors which they had heard they could obtain as a couple, which turns out to be false. These 
instances of absence are actually consequences of an elaborate system of manipulation and 
oppression of the clones, present throughout their lives from the panoptic Hailsham through 
the ostensible freedom as carers until their peaceful “completion” as donors. 
According to Mark Fisher´s analysis of Never Let Me Go, it is the pervasive force of 
ideology that pre-empts even the contemplation of escape or resistance. In his reading, 
Hailsham is an ´ideological state apparatus´135 which prepares the clones for their bleak future 
without having to deal with backlash or aggression, by cannily shaping the clones´ 
unconscious, rather than conscious, knowledge of their future. At one point Kathy describes 
the distribution of information in Hailsham in the following words: ´Certainly, it feels like I 
always knew about donations in some vague way, even as early as six or seven. And it´s 
curious, when we were older and the guardians were giving us those talks, nothing came as a 
complete surprise. It was like we´d heard everything somewhere before.´136 This notion of 
half-knowledge, the knowing and not-knowing, is present throughout their childhoods. Even 
though everyone formally knows that there are donations, they are never spoken about openly 
and when Miss Lucy dares address them in a straightforward manner, she is immediately 
fired.  
This manipulative distribution of information in carefully prearranged dosages is a 
factor that has helped shape the clones´ minds in a way that they do not feel there is any place 
to escape from nor to escape to. There was never a point when the cruel truth was suddenly 
revealed, which happens in most classical dystopias. Instead, the clones cannot remember a 
time when they had not known about the donations at all; it had always been a part of their 
subconscious. The ideological machinery has thus pre-empted any possibility of forming a 
resistant counter-narrative against the illusory narrative that is forced upon them, because that 
would entail acknowledging the illusion and being able detaching oneself from it. The notion 
of escape thus contains no meaning for the clones. As Fisher says, ´if there is nowhere to 
escape to-the clones are already in the world; the world is their prison, then nor is there any 
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attempt to escape.137 The grand tragedy of Never Let Me Go thus lies in this failure to see 
through the ideology and the subsequent apathy to alter the status quo until it is too late. 
Another consequence of a carefully crafted and applied ideology which keeps the 
clones´ behaviour committed to the cause are the hopes and fantasies that schools like 
Hailsham perpetuate without ever overtly confirming or denying them. It is ´the kind of 
collective fantasy that seems to spontaneously grow from institutions like Hailsham (…) 
without which (…) the institution could not do its work.138 The fantasy centres around the 
notion of the “deferrals,” the delays of the duty to become donors for couples of clones who 
are evidently in love. This idea, just like most pieces of half-knowledge circulating around 
Hailsham, have been picked up by the clones as unclear echoes of some past conversations 
rather than any clearly remembered statements uttered by a reliable source. According to 
Fisher, however, ´without this fantasy, the clones would have no hope and thus no reason not 
to rebel, or to destroy themselves.´139 Even though at the end Kathy and Tommy discover the 
bitter truth about the falsehood of deferrals, it comes too late in their lives to cause a dent in 
the ideology´s captivation of their mind and behaviour; the apathetic contentment and the idea 
of the seemingly natural destiny of the clones had been having a corrosive impact on their 
critical faculties for far too long.        
The peculiar ideology in Never Let Me Go is one that dehumanizes the clones in the 
eyes of the society while working in the exact opposite way towards the clones themselves, 
stimulating their hopes, fantasies and aspirations. In this sense the ideology is even more 
comprehensive than the one practiced by IngSoc in George Orwell´s Nineteen Eighty-Four, 
which, while having the capability of changing hearts of rebelling individuals from hatred to 
the most enthusiastic commitment, cannot help but collaterally create enemies by the use of 
brutal force and coercion. The ideology of Never Let Me Go, in contrast, is more that of The 
Matrix:140 The victims are kept in an informational quarantine which indoctrinates them 
completely by making them see the world and their position in it in a carefully manipulated 
way. The consequence of this implementation of ideology is that the clones are hardwired to 
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dogmatically accept the dispersion of power, even though it leans drastically away from their 
favour.  
The ideological apparatus that dehumanizes the posthuman subjects can be read in 
Foucaultian terms as an attribution of inferiority conducted from the position of power. In the 
preface to his book Madness and Civilization (1964), Foucault wrote:  
 
In the serene world of mental illness, modern man no longer communicates with the 
madman: on one hand, the man of reason delegates the physician to madness, thereby 
authorizing a relation only through the abstract universality of disease; on the other, 
the man of madness communicates with society only by the intermediary of an equally 
abstract reason which is order, physical and moral constraint, the anonymous pressure 
of the group, the requirements of conformity.141 
 
Foucault here talks about the role of language in the process of attributing insanity, a form of 
“otherness,” to the part of the population that exhibits non-standard traits of behaviour, as a 
result of which these individuals have to be confined, treated and controlled. The uneven 
ability to influence language, which in turn has the ability to shape the minds and worldviews 
of the population, is indeed present in Never Let Me Go, in which the clones represent a 
specific form of inferiority. The clones communicate with the society in a very limited 
manner, and their way of understanding it and relating to it is indeed mediated by order and 
physical constraint, represented by the boarding school Hailsham, by moral constraint, 
represented by conservative views about sexuality instilled into them by the Hailsham 
teachers and guards, and once out of Hailsham, by the anonymous pressure of the society to 
conform to the its very drastic expectations – in the clones´ case to become cares and 
ultimately donors. 
According to Foucault, the anonymous majority is authorized to translate non-
conforming forms of behaviour or identification as inferior or deficient because it is the 
majority that controls language from the position of power, whose source is the fact that they 
meet the standards of normality. The idea suggested here is that mental illness is to some 
extent a construct created by the society to identify the preferred form of existence as opposed 
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to the non-standard one. The distinction between the sane and the insane has according to 
Foucault´s argument been mediated by language shaped by the former group and applied to 
the social and political discourse, which has come to relate to the two groups according to this 
distinction. Foucault´s contention, applied to posthumanism, means that people who shape the 
public´s view on the posthuman subject, such as theorists, professors, politicians, public 
speakers or writers on posthumanism, have the common power to pre-emptively deprive 
potential posthuman subjects of their “humanity,” or of the equal status with the “standard” 
humans, and add to potentially unhospitable political and social circumstances for such 
subjects, as it also happenes to the clones in Ishiguro´s novel.     
My concluding point in the analysis of Fukuyama´s position on the issue of 
posthumanism therefore is that his line of argument professes to come from exactly the kind 
of reasoning which, though unwittingly, has the potential to bring about the oppressive 
regulations and unfavourable public opinion, of which Ishiguro warns, and which future 
posthuman subjects would be born into. In his rigorous distinction between the human and the 
posthuman, or the non-human, Fukuyama defines the posthuman subject “through the abstract 
universality of disease” or, more accurately, through the universality of difference. His 
attribution of Factor X, however well-meaning, asserts a hierarchical relation between various 
forms of subjectivity, based on power which the socially accepted can exert over others. As he 
writes, ´in the political realm we are required to respect people equally on the basis of their 
possession of Factor X. You can cook, eat, torture, enslave, or render the carcass of any 
creature lacking Factor X, but if you do the same thing to a human being, you are guilty of a 
“crime against humanity.”´142 Fukuyama here talks about the difference between human and 
animal life but the prospect becomes much more serious when the difference between human 
and posthuman life will be on the line. This can be seen on the characters of Never Let Me Go, 
which serves here as a cautionary tale, as it not only shows how drastic the consequences of 
Fukuyama´s Factor X theory put into practice may become, but arguably denies the validity of 
this argument in the first place. The entire novel follows the most intimate thoughts and 
emotions of a clone, showing on every page the full spectrum of her Factor X, which goes 
perpetually unrecognized by the society because it had been established that to qualify for 
Factor X one has to have been conceived in a way that the society deems natural and thus 
acceptable.  
                                                          




With this specific portrayal of the clones in Never Let Me Go, Ishiguro uncovers a 
larger dent in Fukuyama´s theory. Why is it exactly that the clones should not possess Factor 
X? While Fukuyama´s doubts reside on the social level, such that the clones as a group would 
fail to be identified with other humans, Habermas´ arguments are more moralistic and accuse 
the society that produces clones of engaging in unnatural processes and stripping the clones of 
self-autonomy. However, some theorists, such as Yvette Pearson, have demonstrated that all 
such arguments lack substance because they wrongly assume that the circumstances of one´s 
conception and birth decisively determine the individual´s identity. Pearson deconstructs the 
importance of difference between clones and humans and she begins with the form of 
conception. While Fukuyama worries about the unnaturalness of the clones´ creation, Pearson 
argues that many accepted forms of procreation are partially unnatural, such as in vitro 
fertilization or using an incubator at premature childbirth, and that if we are to be consistent in 
the criticism of cloning as unnatural, many other widely used methods and tools used in 
medicine to enhance reproduction should be scrutinized from the same point of view. 
´Ultimately, it seems that we must choose between rejecting many of our procreative practices 
as morally problematic or conceding that reproductive cloning is acceptable.´143 
Next she tackles the issue of the nature of the cloned offspring. Habermas´ argument is 
that the clones, having pre-determined natures, would have lost their self-autonomy but, 
according to Pearson, genotype is not the only factor in forming one´s identity and asserting 
autonomy. While she agrees that the process of cloning would endow the clones with certain 
limitations, it is not ´clear whether or precisely how these limitations have an impact on its 
(the clone´s) autonomy.´144 Instead, it is the individual upbringing and circumstances of life 
that are equally important factors. She illustrates this point by referring to Never Let Me Go, 
arguing that the clones´ ontological status does not impact their personalities or ways of 
identification. On the contrary, even the clones themselves regard their genetic attachment to 
their “possibles” completely irrelevant. While they search for Ruth´s “possible,” Kathy´s 
personal thoughts betray that ´our models were an irrelevance, a technical necessity for 
bringing us into the world… It was up to each of us to make our own lives.´145 Following 
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Pearson´s argumentation, it seems that the dystopian society of Never Let Me Go will more 
likely be caused by a prejudiced society with false notions of what defines the human, rather 
than by an inborn urge to over-dwell on difference.  
Another concern, which Pearson touches upon, is that Fukuyama´s theory is 
misguided because it fails to discuss the posthuman subjects themselves, instead making a 
counter-productive point of dwelling on the circumstances of their origin. As Pearson writes, 
´the emphasis on the means of procreation also detracts from the more important criterion for 
determining the moral permissibility of procreation, namely, how the offspring will fare once 
they are born.´146 This is a major problem with Fukuyama´s argument because instead of 
considering the posthuman subjects as morally autonomous and discussing the circumstances 
of their life, he excludes them from such consideration in the first place, thus effectively 
objectifying them and treating them as a problem to be  prevented. This line of thinking may 
be harmless when applied to a posthuman-free world, but becomes lethal when applied to an 
actual posthuman society, such as the one of Never Let Me Go.  
Furthermore, Fukuyama´s Factor X theory assumes that there are certain privileged 
characteristics and capabilities which safely define humanity. While Habermas sees the 
advantage humans would have over clones in the latter´s failure to develop one´s self-
autonomy, for Fukuyama a true human is endowed with full complexity of human nature. As 
he writes, ´every member of the human species possesses a genetic endowment that allows 
him or her to become a whole human being.´147 These ideas of self-autonomy and wholeness, 
both behavioural and cognitive, constitute patterns identified with universal human conduct 
and are what Mark Jerng calls “narrative expectations” that one associates with humans. In his 
essay “Giving Form to Life: Cloning and Narrative Expectations of the Human,” Jerng 
analyses Never Let Me Go, showing how the novel exposes these expectations to be artificial 
social constructs, harmful to the ones who do not, or cannot conform to them. 
Jerng makes a comparison between the aforementioned film The Island and Never Let 
Me Go to show how cultural tropes feed into the expectations of humans and clones. In The 
Island, the protagonists, who are clones, try to hide their clone identity and substitute it for the 
human identity, thus reaffirming the inferiority of the former. They run away from the clone 
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community, try to act as though they were regular humans, eventually even kill and substitute 
their original model. In contrast, Never Let Me Go is much more subversive in that the clones 
are trying to reconstruct their identities not as humans but as clones, which results in their 
behaviour taking different directions than one would expect from humans, such as the failure 
to contemplate organized resistance or escape. ´The clones do not rebel and thus “become 
human.” Rather, they learn to make sense of their lives as clones. In this way, Never Let Me 
Go disrupts the narrative of individuation and the values placed on the mysteriousness of 
birth, the “giftedness” of life, and wholeness.´148 Thus, against arguments such as a Factor X 
theory, Ishiguro does not claim that clones are in fact humans, as is the gist of narratives such 
as the one of the The Island. Instead, Ishiguro portrays the behaviour of clones as different 
than that of humans but at the same time, by intimating Kathy´s experience so closely, 
dislocates the centrality of the expected human conduct which, as has been portrayed, relates 
to force, rebelliousness and aggression. Thus, despite the obvious differences, there is no 
intrinsic moral, intellectual or emotional progression from clone to human, from less 
developed Factor X to the more developed one or from a lesser whole to a more complete 
whole.  
As has been hinted above, Never Let Me Go functions as a succinct dialogue between 
theory and experience. It juxtaposes an overt behavioural failure of the clones to meet the 
established standards of human conduct, and a recapitulation of a first-hand personal 
experience that abounds with emotional and intellectual depth, and which is thus apt to meet 
any criteria of humanity including Fukuyama´s Factor X. According to Jerng, Ishiguro 
thereby accomplishes to substitute an expected form of self-realization by a multiplicity of 
conduct and behaviour, all of them palpably human but none assuming a centrally “human” 
role. Thus, by ´disrupting the narrative trajectory of individuation, Ishiguro gives us the 
imaginative potential of shifting our expectation of the form of humanity,´149 which helps 
undermine the unequivocality of the manner in which a relatable identity is supposed to be 
constituted. 
Instead of drawing exclusionary lines based on varyingly superficial criteria, Jerng 
invokes Never Let Me Go as a space that initiates open-ended dialogue, and echoes Pearson in 
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saying that ´instead of foregrounding the epistemological desire to find out what the clone is, 
it (Never Let Me Go) foregrounds an ethical project to discover how cloning might change 
how we relate to each other, (which) is a question that begins with a different orientation of 
the human.´150 In this sense, Jerng´s reading of Ishiguro´s novel is close to the interpretation 
of Octavia Butler´s Lilith´s Brood from the previous chapter: rather than defining human 
nature based on what it is not, we should understand it as an umbrella term that continuously 
























                                                          






A portion of this thesis has been dedicated to discerning the arguments behind various 
approaches to posthumanism by the theorists writing on the subject. Specifically, Fukuyama´s 
stark pessimism on the matter has been contrasted to other visions of posthumanism which 
consider it a constructive discourse, helpful in contextualizing the issues with inter-connected 
discourses such as humanism, feminism, postmodernism, colonialism, etc. During the 
analysis it has become clear that the very concept of posthumanism, including its likely 
potentials and limitations, is understood in completely different terms by Fukuyama and his 
adversaries. In his essay “Introduction: Toward a Critique of Posthuman Futures,” Bart Simon 
tries to make sense of these contrasting approaches. He argues that Fukuyama and theorists 
such as Hayes or Haraway address fundamentally different concepts of posthumanism. Simon 
calls the one addressed by Fukuyama “popular posthumanism” while he calls the other one, 
practiced by the above-mentioned theorists, “critical posthumanism.” Popular posthumanism 
takes the essential idea from classical dystopias that the only basis for a harmonious and 
morally sound life is unaltered human nature, and connects it with the idea that modern 
technology, biotechnology and cybernetics necessarily pose a threat to this pristine state of 
human existence. According to Simon, ´for popular posthumanism, the future is a space for 
the realization of individuality, the transcendence of biological limits and the creation of a 
new social order.´151 In Fukuyama´s view the most relevant capability of posthumanism is its 
harmful invasiveness into something that needs no external improvement or modification. 
This is why, as Jeff Wallace notes in “Literature and Posthumanism,” ´when Fukuyama wants 
a reference point for the dangers of a posthuman future, (…) he turns to Aldous Huxley’s 
dystopian satire Brave New World,´ 152 instead of any narrative that would give posthumanism 
any credit, because Brave New World captures his fears of how inconspicuously human nature 
may become almost fully neutralized when either state or non-state actors embrace the open 
opportunity provided by a biotechnological breakthrough.  
In contrast, critical posthumanism is, according to Simon, an interdisciplinary 
academic discourse whose field of focus includes a retrospective consolidation of established 
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discourses such as humanism or postmodernism, as well as discussion of the future of 
posthumanism both as discipline and practice. As such, with the help of the contents of the 
posthuman discourse critical posthumanism reevaluates and contextualizes different forms of 
understanding the human, by ´calling into question (…) the politics and analytical prospects 
of various liberal and philosophical humanisms as well as popular posthumanism.´153 
Therefore, while popular posthumanism problematizes largely speculative forms of otherness 
and digressions from humanity, critical posthumanism is more retrospective and inward in 
problematizing the very concept of humanity as a historical, political and ideological concept, 
as seen through the lenses of posthumanism.  
According to Simon, critical posthumanists, unlike Fukuyama, do not consider 
posthumanism and humanism to be two disjointed categories, but rather as ´implicated in the 
ongoing critique of what it is to be human.´154 Fukuyama and Habermas in this sense occupy 
the opposite side of the posthumanist spectrum as they both see humanism and posthumanism 
as two contrasting concepts where the latter threatens to supersede the former, while 
considering the notion of humanism uncritically, as describing a default state of existence. In 
Fukuyama this lack of critique of humanism has its underpinnings in his Hegelian optimism 
about the one-way flow of historical events, interpreted as creating increasingly liberal, 
modern and democratic societies, where the pure and unaltered character of human nature is 
given full credit for this positive development. Fukuyama can be considered a “popular 
posthumanist” because his philosophy of history forces him to assess posthumanism with a 
forged prejudice leading to almost automatic dismissal of any space beyond the humanist 
model. This dismissal in Our Posthuman Future takes form of a constant, one-sided battering 
of the notion of posthumanism, enumerating its possible downsides without balancing them 
with any possible positive outcomes. The reason for this prejudice is Fukuyama´s Hegelian 
view that there can principally be nothing after humanism because once humanism has taken 
full hold of the political and social mechanisms of the global society, there will be no space or 
incentive to develop ideologically, and history will have come to its ideological and political 
end. This vision has many attributes of a certain kind of utopia and since things cannot get 
potentially any better, the only transformation could be a radical downgrade to dystopian 
posthumanism.  
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The two novels analyzed in this thesis complement the academic takes on critical 
posthumanism, both functioning as antidotes to Fukuyama´s clear-cut, simplistic reasoning on 
the topic. Just like their theoretical counterparts, Ishiguro´s and Butler´s novels present 
posthumanism as a ´critique, both of an essentializing conception of human nature, and of 
human exceptionalism,´155 and through posthumanism they reconstruct the notion of the 
human, highlighting and battling long established prejudices and harmful practices such as 
exclusionary politics, which are features that Fukuyama either chooses to ignore or embrace 
as a form of natural human conduct. The novels, moreover, help unravel humanism as an 
ideology rooted in specific historical contexts, as an ideological force that guides and often 
misguides human character and behavior, taking by Fukuyama for granted as a set of 
unchangeable patters flowing directly from the structure of human nature.  
Both novels also destabilize Fukuyama´s Factor X theory, which is a set of ideas that 
feed into the concept of anthropocentrism and human exceptionalism. The method that they 
use to accomplish this is by introducing the posthuman subjects themselves and letting them 
not only interact dynamically with their human counterparts but also narrate their story, so 
that the reader is introduced to their innermost feelings and trains of thought “first-hand” and 
can understand that while they are not human in the traditional sense, they can possess Factor 
X nevertheless. Furthermore, the posthuman characters Akin and Jodahs of Lilith´s Brood as 
well as Kathy H. of Never Let Me Go expose anthropocentrism to be a harmful construct 
formed by a prejudiced form of humanism which involves the presumption of an ideal 
subjectivity, the one fully human, and attributing moral value to other forms of human or 
posthuman subjectivities based on their relative distance from that ideal center. As Wallace 
puts it, ´humanism can be a narrowly Western version of liberal-humanist individualism, 
sanctioning (…) a relation of domination and subjugation to its externalized others – animals, 
machines, nature, the environment, nonindividualistic cultures and – in the case of the 
ambiguously generic ‘man’ – women.´156 This exclusionary politics is reaffirmed by 
Fukuyama but consciously aimed only at posthumanism, even though the same rationale can 
be found in many historical cases of groups of people dominating one another and is an 
important ideological force behind concepts such as racial or sexual discrimination. A 
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succinct illustration of this can be found in Lilith´s Brood, where Lilith faces a double 
challenge; she has to convince people to trust the Oankali - the posthuman subjects, but first 
she has to overcome the prejudice of her own people (most overtly expressed by men) about 
herself, a female, being the leader of the group.   
In contrast, critical posthumanism tries to reform this established brand of humanism 
from being a rigid concept defining its subject-matter negatively based on difference. While 
the notion of humanism is not rejected altogether, the effort of writers such as Hayles and 
Haraway or novelists like Ishiguro or Butler is to change its character from being exclusive to 
inclusive, and from a closed space to an open space, whereby new subjectivities are allowed 
to enter, thus inevitably transforming the general definition of what makes up a human along 
the way. This pluralistic understanding of the human and the effort to decentralize the 
anthropocentric concept of the optimal identity aims to achieve a dispersion of attribution of 
moral value and autonomy to a larger spectrum of agency and identity than just to those who 
can be judged by an external authority to possess Factor X, a vaguely defined notion of innate 
humanity. As such, despite the evident effort to accomplish just the opposite, Fukuyama 
strengthens the rationale for maintaining inequality, not only between the human and the 
posthuman, but also among different groups of humans themselves, by maintaining the 
notions of difference and almost an Aristotelian definitional rigidity, when it comes to an 
unchanging nature of species, as cornerstones of his theory. In this light, Ishiguro´s and 
Butler´s novels can be seen as an effort to recuperate this misfired attempt to preserve 
freedom, equality and moral balance into the posthuman era, by radically widening the criteria 
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